



CCSA



ASDRC

# Report on 2021 Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index

---

May, 2021

A row of white sailboats is positioned along the horizon of a globe, which is set against a bright sunburst background. The globe shows the outlines of continents and oceans.

China Cross-Strait Academy (Building)  
Asian Social Development Research Center  
Xiamen Shuju Strait Research Institute

## Contents

PREFACE .....	1
1. About Index.....	2
1.1 Definition of Index .....	2
1.2 Reviews on Domestic Studies on Cross-Straits Relations Index.....	2
1.3 Introduction on Overseas Index Research .....	3
2. Preliminary Building of Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index .....	6
2.1 Reference to Index Studies.....	6
2.2 Preliminary Building of Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index .....	7
2.3 Operation Details.....	9
3. Political Factors .....	15
3.1. Taiwan's mainland policies.....	15
3.2 The Taiwan-related policies of the previous congresses of the Communist Party of China and the Statements of the National Leaders.....	25
3.3 Taiwan-related policies in China's Five-year Plans.....	35
3.4 High-level Meetings between leaders of mainland and Taiwan .....	38
3.5 The Conclusion .....	39
4. Military Power .....	40
4.1 Taiwan's defense policy emphasis and mainland related factors.....	41
4.2 The mainland's defense policy emphasis and Taiwan-related factors .....	49
4.3 Military Expenditure of the mainland China and Taiwan .....	53
4.4 Military conflicts of the mainland and Taiwan .....	57
4.5 Military Power Comparison of the mainland and Taiwan.....	59
4.6 The Conclusion .....	70
5. Economic Relations .....	71
5.1 Cross-strait Trade.....	71
5.2 Cross-strait Investment.....	74
5.3 The Conclusion .....	75
6. Social Exchanges and Public Opinions.....	77
6.1 Civil Travels Across the Strait.....	77
6.2 Public Opinions Across the Strait .....	79
6.3 The Conclusion .....	82
7. Foreign Countries' Policies and Positions on Taiwan.....	83
7.1 The United States .....	83
7.2 Japan and Australia.....	85
7.3 The Conclusion .....	88
8. Indicators Coding Result.....	89
9. The Conclusion .....	91
Appendix 1 Cross-Strait Military Power.....	94
Appendix 2 Cross-Strait Trade .....	102
Appendix 3 Social Exchanges and Public Opinions.....	105
Appendix 4 Indicators Coding Result .....	106

---

## PREFACE

Since the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan in the middle of the last century, the relations between the mainland China and Taiwan have been experiencing turbulence with both domestic and foreign factors having their impacts. In recent years, the Democratic Progress Party governing Taiwan has refused to recognize the foundation of mutual political trust between both sides of the strait — the “1992 Consensus”, and have continued to promote “gradual Taiwan independence”, “covert Taiwan independence” and “cultural Taiwan independence”, and even threatened to “start a war at no cost”. All these actions have caused a sharp turnaround in Cross-Strait relations and cast a shadow over the development of Cross-Strait relations. Against this background, China Cross-Strait Academy, jointly with many other organizations, has promoted the “Cross-Strait Relation Risk Index”, aiming to present the changes in Cross-Strait relations more intuitively to the public and reveal the key factors that intensify Cross-Strait relations. This report will provide a quantitative index on the historical evolution of Cross-Strait relations and the current situation, explore the factors behind the changes of peace and conflict, and provide references for Taiwan-related researchers and policy makers.

The report has nine parts. The first part introduces the index, including the definition of the index, literature review, and the reference of foreign studies. The second part is the construction of the index. The third part analyzes the political factors that affect the Cross-Strait relations risk, including Cross-Strait policies, attitudes of leaders on both sides of the strait, major historical events, etc. The fourth part analyzes military factors, including the comparison of the main naval forces and air forces of the two sides of the strait, as well as the comparison of amphibious forces. The fifth part analyzes economic and trade factors, including Cross-Strait trade volume, trade structure, investment volume, etc. The sixth part analyzes social exchanges and public opinion factors, including the Cross-Strait travels, marriages, evolution of Taiwanese self-identification, etc. The seventh part analyzes the influence factors of foreign countries on the Strait situation, including Taiwan-related policies made by the US and Japan, major events, etc. The eighth part is to synthesize the factors analyzed in the above parts and coding of each indicator. The ninth part is the conclusion.

---

## 1. About Index

### 1.1 Definition of Index

Index is widely adopted in social science studies. In statistics, index is in its broad sense a statistical measure of change to qualify trends. Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index is used to measure the change of the “relations risk” between China’s mainland (hereafter as “the mainland”) and Taiwan over time.

Cross-Strait Relations Risk refers to the risk that peace fails and military conflicts or even massive wars burst between the two sides. Massive war can be the “Reunification War” launched by the mainland or the “Counterattack and Restoration War” launched by Taiwan. Therefore, Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index is a statistical measure of change to represent the change of risk for military conflicts or even massive wars between the mainland and Taiwan over time.

### 1.2 Reviews on Domestic Studies on Cross-Straits Relations Index

It’s not an entirely new pattern to study the relations change between the mainland and Taiwan using Index. As early as 2010, Hu Jiasheng from Xiamen College of Economics and Management has proposed building a comprehensive “Cross-Strait Relations Index” to reflect the change of Cross-Strait relations<sup>1</sup>. In his opinion, index study is on one hand “intuitive” and “measurable”. On the other, it’s continuous and sustainable. As time goes on, massive data can be accumulated to graphically reflect the performance and tendency of Cross-Strait relations in certain period. Yet the pity is that he didn’t further provide a theoretical model for the study.

In 2018, Zou Zhendong and Feng Menglan from Xiamen University put forward the idea of compiling Cross-Strait Relations Index<sup>2</sup>. They recommended “an approach combining quantitative and qualitative research” which “figures out the Cross-Strait Relations Index after confirming the weight of different indicators by Subjective Weighting, Analytic Hierarchy Process and Factor Analysis”. This is a 3-level system including 4 first-level, 23 second-level and 59 third-level indicators, reflecting the political, economic and social exchanges and the public opinion across the strait. Sub-indicators will be calculated first and then added up to work out the “Cross-Strait Relations

---

<sup>1</sup> Hu Jiasheng, “A Basic Analysis of Cross-Strait Relations”, *Xiamen Science & Technology*, No.6 (2010), P.20-22.

<sup>2</sup> Zou Zhendong, Feng Menglan, “A Preliminary Study on Cross-Strait Relations Index”, *Taiwan Studies*, No.3 (2018), P.67-79.

---

Index”. Yet Zou Zhendong and Feng Menglan didn’t work out and release the result based on their theoretical model. As Zou mentioned, “big data and index study on Cross-Strait relations is almost blank”.

In April 2021, solid progress on Cross-Strait Relations Index study was achieved by Li Qixiang, You Xiaojun and Wei Suqiong from the Fujian Provincial Key Laboratory of Subtropical Resources and Environment and Fujian Normal University<sup>3</sup>. Drawing on Zou’s index model and adopting the method of event data analysis, they calculated 3 sub-indexes in politics, economy and trade, and culture and tourism across the strait between 2000 and 2018, and worked out the Cross-Strait Relations Index during this period. This filled the blank in index study on cross-strait relations. Detailed methods adopted in their research will be introduced in the second part.

### **1.3 Introduction on Overseas Index Research**

Zou thought it necessary to compile an index because qualitative analysis dominates existing Cross-Strait researches over quantitative analysis. Yet in the field of social science studies, especially when it comes to studies on the relations between two political entities, the researchers must be faced with plenty of “subjective data”. Indicators can be qualitative or quantitative, and the qualitative ones need turning into data. This is the top difficulty in index research.

There are some relatively mature research results overseas. For example, Cato Institute, an American think tank releases Human Freedom Index every year. Yet the value attributes of “freedom” make it hard to measure. The Institute then adopted the method of “approximation and fitting”. Similar to Zou’s model, it involves multi-level indicators, dividing freedom into 2 first-level indicators<sup>4</sup>: personal freedom and economic freedom. Under these two are second-level, third-level, fourth-level and fifth-level indicators.

The Cato Institute assigns a rating of 0 to 10 for each level four and five indicators. There are two types of indicators: qualitative indicators and quantitative indicators. The latter carries data, and the Cato Institute converts them into ratings from 0 to 10 according to certain coding rules. For example, to calculate the value of the third-level indicator "homicide" under personal freedom, the Cato Institute refers to the homicide rate data of various countries

---

<sup>3</sup> Li Qixiang, You Xiaojun, Wei Suqiong, “A Research on Cross-Strait Relations Measurement and the Influence Factors Based on Event Data Study”, *World Regional Studies*, P.1-19.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.cato.org/human-freedom-index/2020>

---

released by the United Nations,. And the researchers stipulate that the homicide rate is coded from 0 to 10 and the country with a homicide rate greater than or equal to 25 (referring to 25 victims per 100,000 population) will receive a rating of 0. With two extreme values being settled, the remaining homicide rates can be mapped into codes from 0 to 10 in turn.

Another example is the third-level indicator government consumption under economic freedom. Its data is the general government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption. The Cato Institute uses the min-max normalization to normalize the data into a decimal between 0 and 1, and multiply it by 10 to get the rating. The score is negatively correlated with the proportion of government consumption.

It is difficult to deal with the qualitative indicator. For instance, under personal freedom there is second-level indicator as legal protection and security, third-level indicator as rule of law, and fourth-level indicator as procedural justice, civil justice and criminal justice. According to the pattern of Cato, researchers may measure the “rule of law” of a country starting from studying the exercise of procedural justice, civil and criminal justice in the country, so as to lay a foundation for measuring the general “personal freedom”.

Seemingly specific enough, the “procedural justice” is an abstract concept in the field of jurisdiction involving quite broad meaning in many aspects. Therefore, it’s not easy to define and measure it.

The Institute pointed out that it referred to the Rule of Law Index<sup>5</sup>, the research result of World Justice Project, when compiling the “rule of law index” of countries. The model of World Justice Project has 9 first-level indicators and 47 second-level indicators. In the research, it released questionnaires to 300 experts in targeted countries, allowing them to code each indicator, based on which it compiled the general index. The process embodies the research pattern to quantify qualitative factors and convert “subjective” indicators into data. The “how the rule of law in a country is” question becomes “how an expert thinks the rule of law in a country is”.

The degree of democracy is also an indicator in Cato’s research. In this respect, it learned from the research of Varieties of Democracy<sup>5</sup>, also a think tank. Like World Justice Project, Varieties of Democracy also adopted an

---

<sup>5</sup> <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2020/methodology>

---

approach that quantified qualitative factors<sup>6</sup>. It invited over 3000 experts across the world to code each indicator. For example, an indicator freedom of religion is coded from 0 to 4. 0 represents the freedom of religion is “not respected by public authorities”, while 4 indicates “fully respected by public authorities”. An expert may give a relatively high rating if he/she thought the country enjoys enough freedom of religion, and a low one if the opposite. It’s notable that coding by experts could also be subjective in some sense. With different cognitions and judgement, different experts’ ratings may vary even for the same indicator of the same country. Yet when it comes to the quantification of abstract problems, this is a relatively reasonable method. Finally Cato Institute will turn the 0-4 coding into 0-10 coding for the index.

After obtaining the coding of the fourth and fifth levels of indicators, the Cato Institute will calculate the average as a country's freedom index for a certain year. There are 27 four-level indicators and 11 five-level indicators under personal freedom, 24 four-level indicators and 25 five-level indicators under economic freedom. However, personal and economic freedom each account for 50% of the weight. This indicates that the weights of each of the fourth and fifth levels are different. The Cato Institute implements a weighted average calculation.

The report will make full use of the mature index research results of the Cato Institute in America, the World Judicial Project, and Varieties of Democracy's. And it will refer to the production method of the "Human Freedom Index", establish a multi-level indicator system, and code the indicators through a set of coding systems. Finally, the result of the index is calculated. This is the internationally accepted method of index construction.

---

6

[https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer\\_public/96/82/9682e043-d302-4e90-b927-3f37e8469acd/v-dem\\_policy\\_brief\\_17\\_2018.pdf](https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/96/82/9682e043-d302-4e90-b927-3f37e8469acd/v-dem_policy_brief_17_2018.pdf)

---

## 2. Preliminary Building of Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index

### 2.1 Reference to Index Studies

Index analysis has been a long-established pattern adopted in international relations studies. Cross-Strait relations are not international relations. Yet in consideration of Taiwan's political independence from the mainland in some degree, index study in international relations can be used to serve the building of index system in this study.

In international relations studies, Behaviorism researchers adopt a method called "Event Data Analysis". That is, selecting a sequence of events in bilateral relations in a period and coding the events to study the tendency of the relations. It was first used in the 1960s. And representative projects are "Conflict and Peace Data Bank" (COPDAB) by Edward Azar in 1982 and "World Event Interaction Survey" (WEIS) by Charles McClelland in 1976, etc.

In China, Li Shaojun from Chinese Academy of Social Science built a "Conflict-Cooperation Model" in 2002 to study the tendency of China-US relations during the Clinton administration<sup>7</sup>. Yan Xuetong and Zhou Fangyin from Tsinghua University enhanced the model<sup>8</sup>. The study by Li Qixiang, You Xiaojun and Wei Suqiong mentioned above is also based on this methodology.

As mentioned before, indicators are either quantitative or qualitative. Qualitative indicators are coded and analyzed. Yan Xuetong proposed 5 steps for this approach.

First, select data sources.

Second, sort out events.

Third, coding.

Fourth, confirm events' influence on bilateral relations.

Fifth, determine the scores of each event based on its history scores and current point of time.

---

<sup>7</sup> Li Shaojun, "Conflict-Cooperation' and the Quantitative Analysis of China-US Relations", *World Economics and Politics*, No.4 (2002), P.43-49.

<sup>8</sup> Yan Xuetong, Zhou Fangyin, "On the Quantitative Measurement of Bilateral Relations", *Social Sciences in China*, No.6 (2004), P.90-103, 206.

For quantitative indicators, Li Qixiang and his fellows suggested normalizing the data and coding analysis after removing the dimensions.

## 2.2 Preliminary Building of Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index

As shown in Table 1, the Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index in this report consists of 3 levels, including 5 first-level, 16 second-level and 38 third-level indicators.

First-level	Second-level	Third-level
A Political Factors	A1 Positions on each other	A11 Taiwan authorities' policies concerning the mainland
		A12 NCCPC policies and CPC leaders' statements concerning Taiwan
		A13 Taiwan policies in the mainland's Five-Year Plans
	A2 High-level visits	A21 High-level visits between the two sides
B Military Power	B1 Defense strategy	B11 Taiwan's defense emphasis and the mainland factors
		B12 The mainland's defense emphasis and Taiwan factors
		B13 Military expenditures of the two sides each year
	B2 Military frictions	B22 Military frictions between the two sides
	B3 Navy main battle force comparison	B31 Destroyers amount comparison
		B32 Frigates amount comparison
		B33 Conventional Submarines amount comparison
		B34 Nuclear Attack Submarines amount comparison
	B4 Amphibious delivery force comparison	B41 Large Landing Ships amount comparison
		B42 Dock Landing Ships amount comparison
		B43 Amphibious Assault Ships(or landing helicopter docks) amount comparison
		B44 Marine Corps building and

	B5 Airborne force comparison	comparison
		B51 4th Generation Fighters amount comparison
		B52 5th Generation Fighters amount comparison
		B53 Medium and Long Range Bombers amount comparison
	B6 Standoff Attack force comparison	B54 Airborne troops force comparison
		B61 Short and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles force comparison
	B62 Cruise Missiles force comparison	
	B7 Army force comparison	B71 3rd Generation Main Battle Tanks comparison
B8 Reconnaissance systems comparison	B81 Air Early Warnings comparison	
C Economic Relations	C1 Cross-strait trade	C11 Cross-Strait trade volume
		C12 Cross-Strait trade volume's proportion in the mainland's total foreign trade volume
		C13 Cross-Strait trade volume's proportion in Taiwan's total foreign trade volume
		C14 The mainland's trade surplus or deficits with Taiwan
	C2 Cross-strait investment	C21 Investment across the strait
D Social Exchanges and Public Opinions	D1 Civil travels across the strait	D11 Number of the mainland residents travelling to Taiwan
		D12 Number of the Taiwan residents travelling to the mainland
		D13 Number of people married across the strait
	D2 Public opinions across the strait	D21 Popularity of "reunification by force" among the mainland residents
		D22 Taiwan residents' recognition of the identity as "Taiwanese"

E Foreign Countries' Policies and Positions on Taiwan	E1 the United States	E11 US arms sales to Taiwan over the years
		E12 US Navy's activities in Taiwan Strait
	E2 US allies	E21 Japan's policies and positions on Taiwan
		E22 Australia's policies and positions on Taiwan

(Table 1: Indicators system for the Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index)

5 first-level indicators cover Political Factors (A), Military Power (B), Economic Relations (C), Social Exchanges and Public Opinions (D) and Foreign Countries' Policies and Positions on Taiwan (E), each with second-level and third-level indicators.

Some of the 38 third-level indicators are quantitative with data and can be quantitatively analyzed, like the amount of destroyers kept by the two sides. Others are qualitative, like NCCPC's polices concerning Taiwan. Some quantitative indicators must be qualitatively analyzed, like the meetings between leaders of the two sides.

### 2.3 Operation Details

After setting the model, this report follows the approaches taken by Yan Xuetong and other scholars to code each indicator.

Step1, select data sources. This report selects government official websites, news agencies, institutes, foundations and other information agencies from the mainland, Taiwan and other countries as events and data sources.

Step2 and Step3, sort out and code the events. For this, Li Shaojun came up with the "Conflict-Cooperation Model", in which he categorizes events in bilateral relations as either conflicts or cooperation and code them separately. Yan Xuetong optimized this model and made a coding table to standardize the coding process.

This report imitates the approach of Yan Xuetong and provides a coding table as Table 2.

	Political Positions and Events	Defense Policies and Events	Foreign Countries' Positions and
--	--------------------------------	-----------------------------	----------------------------------

					Events
	The mainland	Taiwan	The mainland	Taiwan	Political Effects
10	"Must liberate Taiwan", launch the Taiwan campaign	"Counterattack and restoration", announcement of de jure independence, provoking military conflicts	"Liberate Taiwan"	Offensive operation	Stationing of foreign troops into Taiwan, foreign support for de jure independence in Taiwan, foreign support for Taiwan's "counterattack against the mainland"
5 to 9	"Zero tolerance", "not leave the question to the next generation", "make no promise to renounce the use of force", "have no other choice but to use force"	"Two States" theory, "One Country on Each Side", "we are an independent country already", denying "the 1992 Consensus", "no contact, no talks and no compromise", "anti-communist and restoration"	"Make no promise to renounce the use of force", "at all costs", military aircrafts flying around Taiwan	Develop "asymmetrical capabilities", "Effective Deterrence", "multi-domain deterrence"	Foreign military ships and aircrafts appearing in Taiwan Strait, Selling a large amount of advanced military equipment to Taiwan, signing official agreements with Taiwan, official statements prone to "Taiwan Independence"

1 to 4	"Highly alert", "fight resolutely"	"No independence, no unification and no use of force"	"Resolutely safeguard national unity"	defensive operations	Foreign statements favoring Taiwan's membership in international organizations, support for "Taiwan passports" and other things representing political identity
0	Peaceful Reunification, One Country, Two Systems	Recognize "the 1992 Consensus"	"Improve and develop"	"Seek national unification"	Position of "One China"
-1 to -4	"Spare no efforts to achieve the reunification of China"	Adhere to "the 1992 Consensus", deepen cooperation			Stand resolutely on the side of the mainland on the Taiwan problem
-5 to -9	"Strive for peaceful settlement"	Guidelines for National Unification			Implement support for the Mainland by specific policies and actions
-10	"any issue can be discussed"	Carry out talks on unification			Assist China in its course of

					reunification
--	--	--	--	--	---------------

(Table 2: Coding table)

Scores in this table range from -10 to 10. Positive ratings represent events that raise the risk, while negative numbers represent events that reduce the risk and 0 means the event won't cause any change in the risk. 10 indicates melt-down in Cross-Strait relations, extremely high risk, state of or on the brink of war. -10 represents the two sides in very friendly relations.

This table covers three aspects as politics, defense and foreign factors, providing a standard for the assignment of all qualitative indicators of the Index's 38 third-level indicators.

Coding is difficult in practice. For instance, the mainland's positions on Taiwan always start with "Peaceful Reunification and One Country, Two Systems", followed by "fighting resolutely" against separatists. In such cases, this report will code the event between 1 and 4 based on the intensity of the positions declared instead of 0.

Yan Xuetong pointed out that an indicator's assignment at certain point of time should be a joint result of "stocks and flows". It should be a result of the history tendency combining the changes caused by the present event. In other words, researchers need consider both the increment and the stock, because the coding of an indicator at the previous point of time will influence its current assignment. This is the step4 and step5 in Yan's study.

Yet this approach is not that appropriate for studying the indicators of Cross-Strait relations. Yan directly took the "events" as the study object, without labeling them as political, economic and military events to assign separately. The Index in this report is categorized into 5 first-level indicators. Changes in a single indicator are usually very steady. If the method of "accumulation" and "flowing" is adopted, the assignment of an event will quickly approach an extreme value. Therefore, this report will directly use the assignment got in Step3 to analyze the indicators.

For quantitative indicators, this report refers to the solutions by Li Qixiang and his fellows, normalizing the data to eliminate the influence of dimensions.

Set the value of indicator  $i$  in the  $j^{\text{th}}$  year as  $X_{ij}$ .

---

$$X_{ij}' = \frac{\log_{10}(X_{ij})}{\log_{10}(\text{MAX}(X_{ij}))} \quad (\text{Formula 1})$$

This report uses Formula 1 to normalize the data into a decimal between 0 and 1, based on which the indicator is then coded. The normalized result reflects value  $X_{ij}$ 's correlation with the maximum value in the number sequence and can be converted into a score between absolute value 0 and 10. That is, the closer it is to the maximum value, the higher score it will achieve in absolute value, otherwise the opposite. The minimum assignment is 0.

In this process, attention should be paid to the positivity or negativity of the assignment. Drawing on the Conflict-Cooperation Model by Li Shaojun, this report lists some indicators as “cooperation” and assign them with a negative value to indicate they will relieve the risk. Some are listed as “conflicts” and assigned with a positive value to indicate they will increase the risk.

Cooperation indicators: cross-strait trade volume, the proportion the cross-strait trade volume accounts for in their total foreign trade volume, cross-strait investments, number of the mainland residents visiting Taiwan, number of the Taiwan residents visiting the mainland, number of the people married across the strait.

Conflict indicators: all data indicators regarding the comparison of military power, military expenditures, cross-strait trade balance (the mainland's trade deficits), popularity of “reunification by force” among the mainland residents, Taiwan residents' recognition of the identity as “Taiwanese”, US arms sales to Taiwan over the years.

In this report, the two kinds of indicators won't overlap. It won't happen that a “conflict” indicator gets assigned as negative to cause a reduction in the risk. This corresponds to history and reality. Defense and military force building will always increase the risk, and the only question is how much. This is determined by the mission of military forces and the function of arms.

Similarly, as a “cooperation” indicator, higher cross-strait trade volume indicates the two economies are more open to each other, thus risk is lower. Decreased cross-strait trade, unless interrupted, indicates the two sides are still open to each other in some degree, which, though limited in relieving the risk, will not increase it.

The last problem is the weight of each indicator. Li Qixiang applied the entropy

---

method and found politics with the maximum weight of 53.49%, economy and trade of 26.27%, cultural exchanges and tourism of 20.24%.

The entropy method judges the dispersion of a data sequence according to its entropy, based on which the information density and finally the weight of the indicator is decided. It's hard to decide the weight of indicators in this report using this method, for the study in this report covers a long period from 1950 to 2021. In the first 3 decades, only political, military and diplomatic indicators had been taken into account, with no data regarding economic, trade and social indicators. What's more, during the long period, weight of each indicator has changed with time, for which the entropy method does not work.

Therefore, with a reference to the conclusion of Li Qixiang and his fellows' study and in consideration of the history and current state of the Cross-Strait relations, this report gives politics and military power the highest weights, with economy and trade, social and diplomatic indicators following. Such assignment of weight is also in accordance with the thought of Realism school which emphasizes material power like politics and military's influence on international relations.

1950-1977, politics 40%, military power 40%, foreign affairs 20%.

1978-1991, politics 40%, military power 30%, foreign affairs 20%, economy and trade 10%.

1992-2021, politics 40%, military power 30%, foreign affairs 20%, economy and trade 5%, social indicator 5%.

---

### 3. Political Factors

This part discusses the political factors that affect the Cross-Strait relations risk, including two second-level indicators: the attitudes of the two sides of the strait towards each other and the exchange of high-level visits between the two sides of the strait; Four third-level indicators: Taiwan's mainland-related policies, the CPC National Congress's Taiwan-related policies and the central leaders' Taiwan-related statements, the mainland's previous five-year plans' Taiwan-related policies, and cross-strait high-level visits.

For most of the period, Taiwan's mainland-related policies are against reunification. When the Taiwan authorities agreed with the "1992 Consensus" and promote Cross-Strait communications, the situation in the Taiwan Strait was at ease; when Taiwan attempted to "counterattack and restore the country", or promote a "Taiwan independence" policy, and hold a hostile attitude towards the mainland, Cross-Strait risks would increase.

Since 1979, the mainland's Taiwan policy has been relatively stable and has adhered to the policy of peaceful reunification (In 1956, there was the "peaceful liberation" policy). But the mainland also has to respond to the changes of Taiwan authorities' policy and the international situation.

#### 3.1. Taiwan's mainland policies

The victory of the Yangtze River Crossing Campaign in April 1949 marked the beginning of the end of the War of Liberation. The "National Government" led by Chiang Kai-shek (leader of the Nationalist Party of China, i.e., the Kuomintang, the KMT) eventually moved to Taipei, and the Cross-Strait confrontation began to take shape.

Taiwan authorities' mainland policies can be divided into three phases:

In the first phase, from 1950 to 1981, the Taiwan authorities emphasized "counterattack and restoring the country" and repeatedly invaded the mainland and provoked conflicts.

In the second phase, from 1981 to 1998, the Taiwan authorities gave up "counterattack the mainland" and insisted on Cross-Strait reunification at the meantime.

In the third stage, from 1998 to the present, since the Lee Teng-hui authorities put forward the "Two-State theory", all the leaders of the Taiwan authorities,

---

except for Ma Ying-jeou, have been promoting “Taiwan independence”. The mainland resolutely opposes “Taiwan independence”, maintains reunification, and is stepping up military preparations for Taiwan.

The report believes that when the Taiwan authorities promote the “counterattack on the mainland” or “Taiwan independence” policies, the risk of Cross-Strait conflicts increases; when the Taiwan authorities support peaceful reunification, the risk of Cross-Strait conflicts decreases. Representative events are listed below:

1) “A Letter to Compatriots and Civilians on National Day” in 1949

On October 9, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek issued “A Letter to Compatriots and Civilians on National Day” in Taipei<sup>9</sup>. At that time, the War of Liberation was underway. Although Kuomintang lost ground continuously, it still resisted. Chiang Kai-shek said that “he would never admit that it was a fundamental failure,” and that he would continue the “anti-communist war” until “a glorious victory.”

2) Chiang Kai-shek’s series of declaration of stand in 1950

A pattern of confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait was initially shaped by the New Year’s Day of 1950, in which year the “National Government” (hereinafter referred to as “Taiwan authorities” or “Taiwan”) had gain a firm foothold in Taiwan. On New Year’s Day of 1950, Chiang Kai-shek issued “A Letter to Compatriots and Civilians on New Year’s Day”<sup>10</sup>, stating that despite the “biggest national calamity”, the “National Government” should not give up, but “reaffirmed its confidence and strengthened its conviction”, and “struggled hard” to continue the “Anti-Communist War”. On January 5th, Chiang Kai-shek published “The Reasons for the Failure of the National Army and the Urgent Task of Recovering the Country” at the Institute of Revolutionary Practice<sup>11</sup>. Faced with the failure of losing the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek had no plans to succumb. He stated that he would “rebuild the Revolutionary Army”, “eliminate the communists and regain the mainland”, and

---

<sup>9</sup>

[http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1104:0005-68&catid=27&Itemid=256&limitstart=1](http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1104:0005-68&catid=27&Itemid=256&limitstart=1)

<sup>10</sup>

[http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=370:0001-83&catid=228&Itemid=256&limitstart=1](http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=370:0001-83&catid=228&Itemid=256&limitstart=1)

<sup>11</sup>

[http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=315:0001-35&catid=161&Itemid=256&limitstart=1](http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=315:0001-35&catid=161&Itemid=256&limitstart=1)

---

continue the civil war. At that time, Chiang Kai-shek was retired from the political arena and was not the official leader of Taiwan. In March 1950, Chiang Kai-shek “reinstated” and regained his role as “President”. Chiang Kai-shek issued the “Purpose and Mission of Reinstatement”<sup>12</sup>, stating that his mission was to “restore the Republic of China and rescue the compatriots in the mainland” and to “fight back to the mainland and restore the motherland”, that was, to continue the civil war. Chiang Kai-shek put forward the plan of “One year for training; Two years for counterattack; Cracking down the Communist bandits successfully in three years”, and speeded up the preparations for war. Beginning in January 1950, the Taiwan authorities began to make military preparations for a counterattack against the mainland. The first step was the reorganization of the troops. The “National Military” (hereinafter referred to as the “Taiwan Military”) army in Taiwan would be reorganized into 12 armies and 38 divisions.

### 3) “Three-Seven-Five Executive Department” was established in 1951

In 1951, Taiwan’s Defense Department established the “Three-Seven-Five Executive Department” to make a plan to counterattack the mainland<sup>13</sup>. Taiwan’s Defense Department formulated three combat plans, intending to take the opportunity of Chinese People’s Volunteers’ fight in North Korea to launch landing operations in coastal areas.

### 4) Chiang Kai-shek’s series of declaration of stand in 1952

At the request of Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan’s Defense Department set up a “Five-Three Plan” group to replace the “Three-Seven-Five Executive Department” and continued to make a plan for counterattack against the mainland. That was the “Five-Five-Year Construction Plan”. The plan hadn’t been completely made until 1957. In October 1952, Kuomintang held its Seventh National Congress in Taipei<sup>14</sup>. Chiang Kai-shek issued a report. He firstly acknowledged the “failure” of the “National Government” in political, economic, and military aspects, and Kuomintang was “coming to the juncture of national and cultural survival.” However, Chiang Kai-shek did not admit

---

<sup>12</sup>

[http://www.ccfed.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1063:0005-30&catid=161&Itemid=256](http://www.ccfed.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1063:0005-30&catid=161&Itemid=256)

<sup>13</sup>Chen Hongxian, “the Trilogy of Counterattack: A Study on Taiwan’s Counterattack in the Early 1950s”, 2013.

<sup>14</sup>

[http://www.ccfed.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1954:0014-20&catid=175&Itemid=256&limitstart=0](http://www.ccfed.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1954:0014-20&catid=175&Itemid=256&limitstart=0)

---

defeat. He wanted to “save the nation and survive” in Taiwan and “consolidate Taiwan and counterattack against the mainland.” This determined the policy direction of the “National Government” at that time. In 1952, the Taiwanese army reorganized its troops into 12 armies and 28 divisions, and installed US aiding equipment to increase combat effectiveness.

#### 5) “Hikari” war plan and “Kai An”

In May 1953, the military advisory group (“White group”) composed of old Japanese soldiers completed the counterattack plan code-named “Hikari”. The counterattack was expected to be launched in the spring of 1958. In December 1953, Taiwan’s Defense Department made a plan to prepare for the counterattack against the mainland. The plan was called “Kai An”, which reorganized the Taiwanese military into 4 army groups, including 36 infantry divisions, four armored divisions, and one paratrooper division, together with the navy and air force, and demanded to purchase a large amount of equipment. The plan was to be completed by the end of 1955, and then Chiang could wait for an opportunity to counterattack the mainland. Due to the huge cost, Taiwan hoped to receive assistance from the US, especially the need to purchase a large number of naval vessels. In 1954, Taiwan reorganized its troops for the third time, and the military was much closer to the American standards. The Taiwan army had two army groups, eight corps, and 24 divisions, becoming a “refined”, “young and strong”, “centralized”, and “Americanized” troop. Its combat effectiveness had also been improved.

#### 6) The Fifth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee and the Sixth Plenary Session of the KMT

In March 1955, when the KMT held the Fifth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, Chiang Kai-shek issued a report stating that the Taiwan authority must persist in the “long-term resistance” and continue to prepare to counterattack against the mainland<sup>15</sup>. Chiang Kai-shek predicted that World War III (the supposed all-out war between the US and the Soviet Union) was about to break out. This would be good opportunity to “counterattack the mainland.”

At the closing ceremony of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee held in October, Chiang Kai-shek illustrated the progress of

---

<sup>15</sup>

[http://www.ccf.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=730:0003-37&catid=179&Itemid=256&limitstart=0](http://www.ccf.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=730:0003-37&catid=179&Itemid=256&limitstart=0)

---

“counterattack and restoration”<sup>16</sup>. He stated that the military strength of the Kuomintang had “increased by at least 10 times” compared to what it was in 1949. He encouraged people to wait for the opportunity to “launch a counterattack against the mainland.” It can be seen that Taiwan had always been actively preparing for a full-scale war against the mainland, and will launch it whenever the time was right. The Cross-Strait risk was high.

#### 7) The Eighth National Congress of KMT

In October 1957, the KMT held the Eighth National Congress. Chiang Kai-shek proposed that the central task of the Eighth National Congress was to “determine the general strategy for counterattack and restoration” in order to “spur on the plan.”<sup>17</sup> At that time, due to the opposition of the US, plans to counterattack the mainland such as “Kai An” could not be implemented, but the Taiwan authorities still regarded “counterattack and restoration” as their central task.

#### 8) Wuhan Plan

In November 1958, Chiang Kai-shek formulated the “Wuhan Plan” that relied on airborne troops to launch a counterattack<sup>18</sup>. It was changed to the “Kunlun Plan” in 1960 and was later replaced by the “Guoguang Plan”.

#### 9) Guoguang Plan

In April 1961, Taiwan’s Defense Department established the “Guoguang Operation Room” and successively formulated 26 combat plans to counterattack the mainland<sup>19</sup>. Since 1961, the Taiwan authorities had planned the “Haiwei Operation” for special operations on the mainland. On New Year’s Day in 1962, Chiang Kai-shek published “A Letter to All Taiwan Military and Civilian Compatriots”, stating that “Taiwan’s military has been fully prepared for counterattack operations and can start at any time.”<sup>20</sup> In accordance with

---

<sup>16</sup>

[http://www.ccf.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1647:0010-27&catid=179&Itemid=256&limitstart=0](http://www.ccf.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1647:0010-27&catid=179&Itemid=256&limitstart=0)

<sup>17</sup>

[http://www.ccf.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1888:0013-24&catid=182:2014-06-12-03-06-23&Itemid=256](http://www.ccf.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1888:0013-24&catid=182:2014-06-12-03-06-23&Itemid=256)

<sup>18</sup> Ye Huifen, “Chiang Kai-shek and the Making of Counterattack Plans-Taking ‘Wuhan Project’ as an Example”, *Bulletin of Academia Historica*, No. 50(2016): P.147-193.

<sup>19</sup> Lin Zhengyi, “Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong and John F. Kennedy and the 1962 Taiwan Strait Crisis”, *Prospect Quarterly*, No. 04 (2012): P.63-124.

<sup>20</sup>

[http://www.ccf.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=383:0001-95&catid=241&Itemid=256&limitstart=1](http://www.ccf.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=383:0001-95&catid=241&Itemid=256&limitstart=1)

---

Chiang Kai-shek's instructions, the Taiwan military had continuously launched attacks on the mainland. Cross-Strait armed conflicts continued, and the risks remained high.

#### 10) The Ninth National Congress of KMT

In November 1963, the KMT held the Ninth National Congress chaired by Chiang Kai-shek<sup>21</sup>. At that time, the mainland had just endured 3 years of hardships, and the Sino-Soviet relation had gone sore. These incidents gave the Taiwan authorities some hope. Chiang Kai-shek said that the task of the Ninth National Congress of the Kuomintang was to “spur on the strategy for the restoration” and to make political mobilization on the eve of the counterattack, to “supervise the completion of the counterattack and restoration mission”, that was, to continue to promote the counterattack against the mainland and continue to put “restoration” as the most important affairs of the Kuomintang and the Taiwan authorities. At the same time, the Taiwan military was strengthening its combat readiness. In November 1963, Chiang Kai-shek inspected the military and watched the Navy's “Songshan Exercise”<sup>22</sup>.

#### 11) The Tenth National Congress of the Kuomintang

In June 1965, Chiang Kai-shek inspected the Army Officer School and stepped up the deployment and implementation of the “Guoguang Plan.” In August, the Taiwan military suffered a crushing defeat at the Battle of Dongshan Island. In December 1967, the “Guoguang Operation Office” began to be downsized<sup>23</sup>. In March 1969, Chiang Kai-shek presided over the Tenth National Congress of the Kuomintang. In the face of the setbacks of the past few years, Chiang Kai-shek still believed that “anti-communist struggle” and “revolutionary restoration” were the primary tasks of the Kuomintang<sup>24</sup>. The Taiwan authorities should take advantage of the chaotic situation of the mainland's “Cultural Revolution” to launch an offensive. In an interview with a Spanish reporter in July, Chiang Kai-shek declared that “recovering the mainland is my

---

21

[http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=2020:0015-24&catid=189&Itemid=256&limitstart=0](http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2020:0015-24&catid=189&Itemid=256&limitstart=0)

22

[http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=2078:0016-24&catid=189&Itemid=256](http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2078:0016-24&catid=189&Itemid=256)

<sup>23</sup> Cai Zhenxin, “Rethinking the August 6<sup>th</sup> Battle and Wuqiu Battle”. *Naval Officer*, No. 36(2017):P.36-49.

24

[http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1559:0009-38&catid=196&Itemid=256&limitstart=12](http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1559:0009-38&catid=196&Itemid=256&limitstart=12)

---

highest basic national policy.”<sup>25</sup>

#### 12) The Eleventh National Congress of the Kuomintang

In 1972, the “Guoguang Operation Office” was abolished. In November 1973, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the Kuomintang, President Chiang Ching-kuo announced the completion of the "Ten Construction" within five years, which were the ten major construction projects on the island of Taiwan<sup>26</sup>. The central task of the Taiwan authorities began to shift to internal affairs. In November 1976, the Kuomintang convened the Eleventh National Congress. This is the first meeting after Chiang Kai-shek's death, which was presided over by Chiang Ching-kuo<sup>27</sup>. The meeting passed the "Anti-Communist Restoration Program of Action," and the Taiwan authorities continued to implement the policy of counterattack against the mainland.

#### 13) The Twelfth National Congress of the Kuomintang

In March 1981, the KMT held the Twelfth National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "KMT Twelfth Congress"), and Chiang Ching-kuo presided over the meeting<sup>28</sup>. The Twelfth Congress of the Kuomintang no longer mentioned "counter-attack on the mainland", but instead "unified China with the Three People's Principles." The Taiwan authorities have since abandoned their attempts to "recover the country" by launching large-scale wars, and the risks across the strait had been significantly reduced. At the same time, the conference passed the "Implementation of the People's Livelihood Social and Economic Construction Project of the Rejuvenation Base", hoping to use Taiwan as a "model" for economic construction and welfare system building to achieve the goal of peaceful influence. But Chiang Ching-kuo also proposed no contact, no negotiation, no compromise with the mainland (the "three no policy"), rejection of the “three links”, and "the basic national policy of anti-communist restoration will never change."

#### 14) Lifting the Martial Law and the Thirteenth National Congress

---

<sup>25</sup>

[http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=681:0003-169&catid=398&Itemid=256](http://www.ccfid.org.tw/ccef001/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=681:0003-169&catid=398&Itemid=256)

<sup>26</sup> <http://www1.kmt.org.tw/page.aspx?mid=74>

<sup>27</sup>

<http://cnki55.sris.com.tw/refbook/ShowDetail.aspx?Table=CRFDOTHERINFO&ShowField=Content&TitleField=Title-ShowTitle&Field=OTHERID&Value=R20060511200A000018>

<sup>28</sup> <http://nrch.culture.tw/twpedia.aspx?id=3904>

---

In July 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo issued an order to lift martial law in Taiwan. In 1988, the KMT convened the Thirteenth National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "Thirteenth Congress of the KMT"), and Lee Teng-hui presided over the meeting. The Thirteenth Congress of the KMT passed the "Promotion of the Three Principles of the People-Towards a Democratic, Equalized, and Reunified New China" and the "Mainland Policy Case of the Chinese Kuomintang at the Current Stage", which proposed to gradually open cross-strait relations and had further reduced the risk of the strait<sup>29</sup>. In 1990, the Taiwan authorities established the Straits Exchange Fund<sup>30</sup> and the National Unification Committee. In May 1991, the "period of mobilization for rebellion" officially ended, and the Taiwan authorities established the "Mainland Affairs Council of Executive Yuan." Cross-strait exchanges began to accelerate.

#### 15) The Guidelines for National Unification

In 1991, Taiwan's National Unification Commission and Taiwan's administrative department (i.e., the Executive Yuan) passed the "the Guidelines for National Unification" to guide the Taiwan authorities' cross-strait policies. The National Unification Guidelines pointed out that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should be reunified peacefully, "under the principles of rationality, peace, reciprocity, and reciprocity, it will be gradually achieved in stages." The first was the phase of exchanges and reciprocity, then the phase of mutual trust and cooperation, and finally the phase of negotiation and unification<sup>31</sup>.

#### 16) The Fourteenth National Congress of KMT

In 1993, the Kuomintang held its Fourteenth National Congress. Taiwan's leader Lee Teng-hui proposed "building Taiwan and reunifying China", saying that the confrontation between the two sides of the strait is not a military confrontation, but a "brain power and policy competition."<sup>32</sup>

#### 17) Lee Teng-hui visited the US

In June 1995, Taiwan's leader Lee Teng-hui visited Cornell University in private. Lee Teng-hui put forward the concept that "the Republic of China is in Taiwan",

---

<sup>29</sup> <http://61.134.53.202:81/refbook/detail.aspx?recid=R2006060570000251&db=CRFD>

<sup>30</sup> <https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20180408000587-262114?chdtv>

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.mac.gov.tw/MAIRC/cp.aspx?n=F368176BE5500567&s=2947BC4C3FBC8E1C>

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/3225>

---

and Taiwan's "subjective consciousness" began to go public.

#### 18) "Two-state theory"

In 1998, the Taiwan authorities set up a group called "Strengthening the Sovereign State of the Republic of China" to study the relationship between the East and the West Germany during the Cold War, and applied it to explain the Cross-Strait relations. In an interview with Deutsche Welle in 1999, Lee Teng-hui described the relation between the two sides of the strait was "special state-to-state relation", that was the "two-state theory." The Taiwan authorities began to openly move towards Taiwan independence<sup>33</sup>, and Cross-Strait relations tended to become tense.

#### 19) The Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the DPP

In 1999, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) held the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee and passed the "Resolution on the Future of Taiwan." The meeting agreed that Taiwan was a "sovereign and independent country", "does not belong to the People's Republic of China", opposed the "one-China principle" and "one country, two systems" Policy<sup>34</sup>. It was the blueprint for "Taiwan Independence", which played a guiding role in the DPP's later administration.

#### 20) "One country on each side"

In 2000, the DPP came to power during Taiwan's "general election". In August 2002, the then leader of the Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian, stated that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country" and the two sides of the strait "should be clearly distinguished that there is one country on each side". This was how "one country on each side" came into being.<sup>35</sup>

#### 21) The abolishment of The Guidelines for National Unification

In February 2006, Chen Shui-bian "approved" to abolish the National Unification Commission and abolish the Guidelines for National Unification<sup>36</sup>. The Taiwan authorities have gone further and further on the road of "Taiwan

---

<sup>33</sup> <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1041547>

<sup>34</sup> <https://taiwannext.com/%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3%E5%89%8D%E9%80%94%E6%B1%BA%E8%AD%B0%E6%96%87/>

<sup>35</sup> [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHlfuipK5\\_0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHlfuipK5_0)

<sup>36</sup> [https://www.mac.gov.tw/News\\_Content.aspx?n=9B973A5871579AC7&sms=BF6506CCD840CE97&s=67F2DB5FC007AB41](https://www.mac.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=9B973A5871579AC7&sms=BF6506CCD840CE97&s=67F2DB5FC007AB41)

---

independence.”

## 22) “No unification, No independence and No use of force”

In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang came to power and became the leader of Taiwan. His Cross-Strait policy was “No unification, No independence and No use of force”. Ma neither sought “Taiwan independence” as Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian did, nor went back to the path of seeking reunification, and had not restored The Guidelines for National Unification. Ma Ying-jeou admitted the “1992 Consensus” and emphasized “one China with different interpretations”, hoping to ease Cross-Strait relations and promote trade.<sup>37</sup>

## 23) Tsai Ing-wen’s first term

In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP came to power and became the leader of Taiwan. At the inauguration ceremony, Tsai Ing-wen expressed that she would “properly handle Cross-Strait relations” and “promote the peaceful and stable development of Cross-Strait relations.”<sup>38</sup> However, Tsai continued to promote “Taiwan independence” afterward.

In 2019, Xi Jinping delivered a speech to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the publication of “A Letter to Compatriots in Taiwan”<sup>39</sup>. Tsai Ing-wen responded by stating that Taiwan “will never accept ‘One country; Two systems’ and would not accept the ‘1992 Consensus.’” In January 2020, in an interview with the BBC, Tsai publicly stated that Taiwan was “an independent country already.”<sup>40</sup> During Tsai’s first term, Cross-Strait relations gradually deteriorated and the risks across the strait increased.

## 24) Tsai Ing-wen’s second term

In May 2020, Tsai Ing-wen took office for the second time as leader of the Taiwan. At the inauguration ceremony, Tsai expressed her opposition to “One country, two systems” and “dwarfing Taiwan”<sup>41</sup>. Speaking of national defense policy, Tsai expressed the need to accelerate the development of “asymmetric combat power” in an attempt to resist reunification by force.

---

<sup>37</sup> Shi Zhengfeng. “Ma Ying-jeou Administration’s China Policy”, *Taiwan International Studies Quarterly*, No.2(2013):P. 43-66.

<sup>38</sup> <https://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/20444>

<sup>39</sup> <https://tw.appledaily.com/politics/20190103/CEFJSQK3L5M3GFVGH7VIOUKXX4/>

<sup>40</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-51116515>

<sup>41</sup> <https://www.president.gov.tw/Page/586>

---

### 3.2 The Taiwan-related policies of the previous congresses of the Communist Party of China and the Statements of the National Leaders

After 1949, the first Congress of the Communist Party of China was the Eighth National Congress held in 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the "Eighth National Congress"). As of the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the "Nineteenth National Congress"), there have been 12 congresses in total. Since 1949, the CCP's important meetings include the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee and etc. These meetings should also be taken into consideration. The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party will express their stance on Taiwan policy at important moments, and this must also be taken into consideration. In these events, there are two parts related to Taiwan:

First, the general course and policies of the CCP regarding national development. The general courses are blueprints taking a leading role, and all other specific policies, including the Taiwan policy, must conform to the general course.

Second, policies directly related to Taiwan. In 1956, Mao Zedong first proposed "striving for the peaceful liberation of Taiwan." Since then, the Chinese Republic has taken "peaceful reunification" as the basic policy for handling cross-strait issues. However, due to the Taiwan authorities' long-term resistance to peaceful reunification with the help of foreign countries, the implementation of the CCP's cross-strait policy has been fluctuated. Whenever political power promoting "Taiwan independence" comes to power, the mainland has to step up preparations for military struggle against Taiwan in order to maintain national unity. At this time, cross-strait risks will rise.

From the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee to the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the general courses and Taiwan policies, as well as the national leaders' Taiwan-related statements are summarized as follows:

#### 1) the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee

In March 1949, the Chinese Communist Party convened the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee<sup>42</sup> and proposed to annihilate the Kuomintang troops entrenched in anywhere in the country and liberate the

---

<sup>42</sup> [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/202001/202008/t20200818\\_12290913.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/202001/202008/t20200818_12290913.html)

---

whole of China. On March 15, Xinhua News Agency published a current review "The Chinese People Must Liberalize Taiwan," and proposed that the Kuomintang reactionaries should never be tolerated to use Taiwan as a base. At that time, the People's Republic of China had not been formally established, the war of liberation had not yet ended and armed struggle was the center of all work. It was the task of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to liberate Taiwan and then all of China.

## 2) the battle of Quemoy

The battle of Quemoy took place in October 1949 and was part of the War of Liberation. At that time, the People's Republic of China had been formally established, and the task of the People's Liberation Army was to annihilate all remaining Kuomintang troops and liberate all of China. The PLA failed to take Quemoy and failed to achieve the purpose of the campaign. After the battle, Mao Zedong instructed the PLA officers and soldiers to conscientiously sum up their experience and avoid repeating the same mistakes in future amphibious operations<sup>43</sup>. On the one hand, the People's Liberation Army continued the war of liberation on the mainland, and on the other hand, it was preparing to fight across the sea to liberate Taiwan.

## 3) "the peaceful liberation of Taiwan"

In January 1956, Mao Zedong proposed at the supreme state council to prepare for the third cooperation between the KMT and CCP for the "peaceful liberation of Taiwan."<sup>44</sup>

## 4) The Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

Mao Zedong made the opening speech<sup>45</sup>, proposing that the CCP should unite all parties and "strive to build a great socialist China." Liu Shaoqi made a political report<sup>46</sup> and proposed that the current task of the CCP was to unite all parties and use all conditions to "build our country into a great socialist country as quickly as possible." Liu Shaoqi pointed out that China was in the transition period from capitalism to socialism. The general course of the CCP during the transition period was to complete the three major transformations and "gradually realize socialist industrialization." Liu Shaoqi also focused on the

---

<sup>43</sup> CCPCC Document Study Office (editing). "Mao Zedong's Work After the Founding of PRC Volume 1". Beijing: ZYWX Press. 1987.

<sup>44</sup> <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cept/chn/zt/tai/t181589.htm>

<sup>45</sup> <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64560/65452/4442004.html>

<sup>46</sup> <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64560/65452/4526551.html>

implementation of socialist transformation, the implementation and achievements of the First Five-year Plan, and preparations for the Second Five-year Plan. Speaking of Taiwan policy, Liu Shaoqi pointed out that he was **"willing to use peaceful negotiations" to complete national reunification.** If only peaceful method had completely failed, "force of last resort" might have been used. The general course stipulated by the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China focused on construction, and the Taiwan policy was majorly peaceful, reducing risks across the strait.

#### 5) First Taiwan Strait Crisis

In August 1958, there was a large-scale artillery battle between the People's Liberation Army in Xiamen and the KMT military in Quemoy<sup>47</sup>. The artillery battle was large in scale and KMT troops had more than 7,000 casualties. Mao Zedong said that **"basically, it is still a show."** In other words, the political significance of the campaign was greater than the military significance. **This was not a preparation for Taiwan campaign. The CCP's policy on Taiwan had not fundamentally changed.**

#### 6) The Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

In 1969, the CCP held the Ninth National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "Ninth Congress"), and Lin Biao gave a report at the conference<sup>48</sup>. At that time, the "Cultural Revolution" had begun. The CCP had changed its course from construction to "revolution" and "struggle", and the domestic political atmosphere had been tense. Regarding Taiwan, the communiqué of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee released in September 1970 stated that **"Taiwan must be liberated."** The nature of the Taiwan problem was US imperialists' armed occupation of a part of China's territory. The general course stipulated by the "Ninth National Congress" focused on struggle. It clearly proposed to liberate Taiwan, and it did not mention the use of "peaceful means." **This was a response to Taiwan's insistence on "counter-attacking the mainland" and military friction provocations.**

#### 7) The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

In 1973, the Communist Party of China held its Tenth National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "Tenth Congress"). Like the "Ninth Congress",

<sup>47</sup> [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201904/201908/t20190822\\_12195334.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201904/201908/t20190822_12195334.html)

<sup>48</sup> <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64561/4429445.html>

---

the "Tenth Congress" still emphasized "struggle."<sup>49</sup> In terms of domestic policy, it proposed to continue to deepen the "tasks of fighting, criticizing, and reforming of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." The domestic political atmosphere was still tense. In terms of foreign policy, the Tenth Congress opposed "subversion and aggression" of "imperialists", "prepare for war, prepare for famine, and serve the people", and the CCP must be alert to imperialists' possible armed invasion against China. Regarding its policy on Taiwan, the "Tenth Congress" stated that "Taiwan must be liberated." The "Tenth Congress" still focused on struggle and required a good preparation for war. The domestic political atmosphere had not been eased. The "Tenth Congress" continued the course of the "Ninth Congress" on the Taiwan issue and proposed the liberation of Taiwan without mentioning "the use of peaceful means."

#### 8) The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China

In 1977, the CCP held its Eleventh National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "Eleventh Congress")<sup>50</sup>. At that time, the "Cultural Revolution" had ended, and the country needed to determine a new direction. The main content of the "Eleventh Congress" political report was to clear the "left-leaning" mistakes and expose and liquidate the "Gang of Four" anti-CCP clique. In terms of domestic policy, the report "consolidate and develop the victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" and continued to implement the revolutionary course. In terms of foreign policy, the Party should continue to "prepare for war" to guard against armed invasion by imperialists. The domestic political atmosphere remained tense. On Taiwan, the report stated that "Taiwan must be liberated," continuing the formulation of the previous two conferences. In short, the course proposed by the "Eleventh Congress" was "revolution" and "struggle." War preparations and the Taiwan were emphasized together, "**be prepared for a war against invasion, and be prepared for the liberation of Taiwan,**" and the Party should prepare to launch a military operation to reunify Taiwan.

#### 9) The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee

In 1978, the Chinese Communist Party convened the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee<sup>51</sup>. The conference report pointed out that the

---

<sup>49</sup> <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64562/65450/4429430.html>

<sup>50</sup> [http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/25/ART11348541192153839\\_all.shtml](http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/25/ART11348541192153839_all.shtml)

<sup>51</sup> <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65371/4441902.html>

---

**CCP should refocus its work on "socialist modernization," centering on "economic aspects" and "technical revolution,"** and starting the reform of the domestic economic system instead of emphasizing "struggle." The domestic political atmosphere began to ease. In terms of Taiwan, the report did not mention that "Taiwan must be liberated," but that "the prospect of achieving the great cause of reunification has been further placed before us" and welcomed the contributions of Taiwan compatriots. The policy proposed by the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee had undergone a major change compared with the "Eleventh Congress". It no longer mentioned "revolution" and "struggle", and focused on economic construction to ease the domestic political atmosphere; it no longer mentioned "preparation for war", "Taiwan must be liberated."

10) "A Letter to Compatriots in Taiwan" and "One Country, Two Systems" were proposed

On January 1, 1979<sup>52</sup>, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued the "Notice to Compatriots in Taiwan", expressing the hope that the country would be reunified as soon as possible, and at the same time emphasizing peace and proposing the hope that the Taiwan issue could be resolved in a peaceful manner. The PLA was ordered to stop shelling Quemoy and other islands and sincerely expressed the concept of peace. The mainland stated its hope to end the cross-strait military confrontation, open air and postal services as soon as possible, and promote cross-strait exchanges.

In January 1979, Deng Xiaoping proposed the idea of peacefully solving the Taiwan issue through "one country, two systems"<sup>53</sup>.

11) The Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

In 1982, the Chinese Communist Party convened its Twelfth National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "Twelfth Congress")<sup>54</sup> and proposed that "the primary task is to push forward the socialist modernization of the economy." On the basis of economic system reform, the "Twelfth Congress" proposed "opening-up." In terms of Taiwan, the Party proposed to work with Taiwan compatriots to "work hard to promote the great cause of the reunification of the motherland." At that time, Taiwan gave up its "counter-offensive to restore the country," and the mainland followed suit and

---

<sup>52</sup> <https://m.news.cctv.com/2021/03/05/ARTIbLEA5v7kAsPkQL0YpkiY210305.shtml>

<sup>53</sup> [http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2017-11/08/content\\_5238062.htm](http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2017-11/08/content_5238062.htm)

<sup>54</sup> [http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348712095996447\\_all.shtml](http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348712095996447_all.shtml)

---

released goodwill. In short, the CCP continued to focus on economic construction, domestic reforms, and opening to the outside world, and the rhetoric towards Taiwan was mitigating.

#### 12) The Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

In 1987, the Chinese Communist Party convened its Thirteenth National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "Thirteenth Congress")<sup>55</sup>. This conference made the conclusion that China was in the primary stage of socialism lagging behind in productivity, and the commodity economy was not developed. The major problem at this stage was "the contradiction between the people's growing material and cultural needs and the insufficient social production." Class struggle was not the major problem. This judgement required the Party to "vigorously promote commodity economy, increase labor productivity" and to gradually realize modernization. China must persist in reform and opening-up, and concentrate on modernization. Regarding Taiwan, **the report proposed to "strive for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem" in accordance with the principle of "one country, two systems."** In short, the report of the "Thirteenth Congress" proposed to continue to adhere to reform and opening-up, to focus on economic construction, and to retreat from class struggle, and the domestic political atmosphere had been further eased. The Thirteenth Congress clearly proposed to "strive for a peaceful settlement" on Taiwan problem.

#### 13) The Fourteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

In 1992, the Chinese Communist Party convened the Fourteenth National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "Fourteenth Congress")<sup>56</sup>. Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, delivered a report at the conference and proposed that the task in the 1990s was to "speed up reform and opening-up and concentrate on economic construction." Other work, such as the construction of spiritual civilization, must be circled around economic construction. On Taiwan, Jiang Zemin proposed to "promote the accomplishment of the great cause of the peaceful reunification of the motherland" with the principle of "one country, two systems". On the one hand, it resolutely opposed any form of Taiwan independence. On the other hand, it promoted cross-strait exchanges and economic cooperation, created conditions and made contacts with the KMT, and "conducts

---

<sup>55</sup> <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64566/65447/4526368.html>

<sup>56</sup> [http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/26/ARTI1348641194361954\\_all.shtml](http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/26/ARTI1348641194361954_all.shtml)

---

negotiations on the formal end of cross-strait hostility and the gradual realization of peaceful reunification." On the premise of one China, "any issue can be discussed" and "find a method that both sides deem appropriate." In short, the "Fourteenth Congress" continued to adhere to the idea of focusing on economic construction and criticizing the "class struggle as the course", and the domestic political atmosphere continued to ease. About Taiwan, the Party continued to emphasize "one country, two systems" and "peaceful reunification", "anything can be discussed." The Party emphasized on promoting cross-strait exchanges and cooperation on specific issues. Those attitudes represented the Party's response to Taiwan's establishment of the "National Unification Council" and the adoption of the "the National Unification Guidelines" actively promoting cross-strait reconciliation.

14) In response to Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States, the then President Jiang Zemin emphasized his opposition to "Taiwan independence" in an interview with the US media in October 1995. Jiang Zemin proposed that he would not promise to give up the use of force. Once the peaceful situation was broken, China was determined to resolve the Taiwan problem in a non-peaceful way.

In March 1996, the People's Liberation Army launched a cross-service joint combat exercise in the Taiwan Strait. Zhang Wannian, then vice chairman of the Military Commission, pointed out that the mainland was committed to peaceful reunification, but never promised to give up the use of force. "If foreign forces interfere with China's reunification, if Taiwan declares independence, we will adopt all means including military means to resolutely safeguard the reunification of the motherland, defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity"<sup>57</sup>.

15) The Fifteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

In 1997, the Communist Party of China held its Fifteenth National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "Fifteenth Congress"), and Jiang Zemin, the general secretary of the Communist Party of China, gave a report<sup>58</sup>. Jiang Zemin pointed out that the CCP must unswervingly adhere to the basic course of the initial stage of socialism, focus on economic construction, adhere to the four basic principles, adhere to reform and opening-up, and build socialism with Chinese characteristics. The meeting proposed to develop a market

---

<sup>57</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpofUEViLBY>

<sup>58</sup> [http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348726215537612\\_all.shtml](http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348726215537612_all.shtml)

---

economy under socialist conditions, continuously liberate and develop productive forces, and establish a relatively complete socialist market economic system. The Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed for the first time "realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." On Taiwan, the meeting proposed to insist on implementing "one country, two systems" and "promoting the peaceful reunification of the motherland." But at the same time, the Party firmly opposed the separatist forces promoting Taiwan independence and **"cannot promise to give up the use of force."** The report has 10 parts, of which "Promoting the Peaceful Reunification of the Motherland" was listed one of them, which indicated that the Taiwan (and Hong Kong and Macao) had been raised to great significance, which was the first time since the previous congresses of the CCP. In short, the "Fifteenth Congress" continued to focus on economic construction. When talking about work with Taiwan, on the one hand, it emphasized peaceful reunification. On the other hand, it used stronger language to oppose the parties promoting Taiwan independence. This was the first time since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee.

#### 16) The Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

In 2002, the Communist Party of China held the Sixteenth National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "Sixteenth Congress"), and the General Secretary of the CCP Jiang Zemin gave a report<sup>59</sup>. The meeting put forward the need to comprehensively implement the important thinking of the "Three Represents", build a moderately prosperous society in all respects, and "persist in focusing on economic construction and solving the problems in the developing process." The report continued the rhetoric concerning Taiwan in the report of the Fifteenth Congress, and included "Achieving the Complete Reunification of the Motherland" as a part of the report, which indicated that the CCP attached great importance to it. At that time, Hong Kong and Macao had returned, and the issue of "achieving the complete reunification of the motherland" had already referred to the Taiwan problem solely. Against this background, the report proposed the basic policy of "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems". Under the premise of one China, "any issue can be discussed," including "the political status of the Taiwan authorities and other issues." At the same time, it resolutely opposes the "parties promoting Taiwan independence" and "will never promise to renounce the use of force." The report also stated that "the Taiwan problem cannot be postponed indefinitely."

---

<sup>59</sup> [http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348734708607117\\_all.shtml](http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348734708607117_all.shtml)

---

It can be seen that the Sixteenth Congress continued to focus on economic construction. On the one hand, it emphasized peaceful reunification and promoted cross-strait exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan. On the other hand, the Party opposed Taiwan's independence with stronger language, and proposed for the first time that "the Taiwan problem cannot be postponed indefinitely." In other words, there must be arrangements and timetables for resolving it.

#### 17) The Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

In 2007, the Chinese Communist Party convened the Seventeenth National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "Seventeenth Congress"), and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Hu Jintao gave a report.<sup>60</sup> In terms of the country's course, the Party proposed to "continue to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects and accelerate socialist modernization." In terms of foreign relations, the report emphasized that "unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development" and for the first time proposed that China "pursues a defensive national defense policy", "never seek hegemony, never engage in expansion", and was committed to peaceful settlement of international disputes and hotspot issues. Taiwan was discussed in its own part, indicating that the great significance of Taiwan to the Party had not reduced. The "Seventeenth Congress" still proposed to promote the practice of "one country, two systems" and the "great cause of peaceful reunification of the motherland", while resolutely opposing the separatists promoting "Taiwan independence". In short, the "Seventeenth Congress" continued to focus on economic construction. The emphasis on the concept of peace in foreign relations had not been seen in previous congresses. Regarding the Taiwan issue, the report did not mention "never promise to renounce the use of force," nor did it mention that "the Taiwan problem cannot be postponed indefinitely." The title of the part discussing Taiwan was "Promoting the Practice of 'One Country, Two Systems' and the Grand Cause of Peaceful Reunification of the Motherland", rather than "Realizing the Complete Reunification of the Motherland" in the Sixteenth Congress. The change in rhetoric indicated the change in the CCP's approach to Taiwan, and that of the "Seventeenth Congress" had been more mitigating.

#### 18) the Eighteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

---

<sup>60</sup> [http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/06/11/ART11339412115437623\\_all.shtml](http://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/06/11/ART11339412115437623_all.shtml)

---

In 2012, the Communist Party of China held the Eighteenth National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the "Eighteenth Congress"), and General Secretary Hu Jintao made a report<sup>61</sup>. The report of the Eighteenth Congress stated that the CCP "will unswervingly advance along the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects." With regard to national defense and foreign policies, the Party would pursue a defensive policy and stick to the path of peaceful development. On Taiwan, the report stated that the policy of "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems" must be adhered to to ensure the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and create more adequate conditions for peaceful reunification. The Party had to adhere to the one-China principle and oppose the "Taiwan independence" separatism conspiracy. The report stated that the CCP should continue to "firmly focus on economic construction." National defense construction was to provide economic construction with conditions for peaceful development. In terms of Taiwan policy, the "Eighteenth Congress" continued the rhetoric of the "Seventeenth Congress", and the rhetoric was relatively relaxed, which corresponded to the improvement in cross-strait relations during Ma Ying-jeou's administration.

#### 19) The Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

In 2017, the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (hereinafter referred to as the "Nineteenth Congress") was held. The General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping made a report<sup>62</sup> and continued to put forward the idea of "focusing on economic construction". But the report only mentioned it once, and the emphasis has been reduced. **In contrast, the report repeatedly highlighted the realization of "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation"** and required the Party to strive for the realization of the great rejuvenation. This indicated that national rejuvenation had replaced economic construction as the new focus of the CCP's work. In 2017, great achievements had been made in the economic construction of the mainland. The connotation of national rejuvenation was richer, including economic dimensions and other dimensions such as politics. The necessary condition for national rejuvenation was national unity. When talking about Taiwan, the "Nineteenth Congress" proposed to continue to adhere to the policy of "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems", and at the same time, it proposed to resolutely oppose "Taiwan independence" and **"will**

---

<sup>61</sup> [http://www.12371.cn/2012/11/17/ARTI1353154601465336\\_all.shtml](http://www.12371.cn/2012/11/17/ARTI1353154601465336_all.shtml)

<sup>62</sup> <http://www.12371.cn/2017/10/27/ARTI1509103656574313.shtml>

---

**never tolerate the recurrence of the historical tragedy of national division",** responding to the "Taiwan independence" of Tsai Ing-wen's government. Compared with what had been done in previous congresses since the reform and opening-up, the "Nineteenth Congress" emphasized "national rejuvenation." Compared with the "Eighteenth Congress", the "Nineteenth Congress" had stronger rhetoric against Taiwan independence. **This was the CCP's response to the increasingly tense cross-strait relations caused by Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan independence" policy after she took office.**

20) Commemorating the 40th anniversary of the publication of "A Letter to Compatriots in Taiwan"

On January 2, 2019, Xi Jinping hosted an event to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the publication of "A Letter to Compatriots in Taiwan" and delivered a speech<sup>63</sup>. Xi Jinping emphasized that "the motherland must be reunified" and national reunification is an "inevitable requirement" for national rejuvenation. **Xi Jinping pointed out that the Taiwan problem could not be "passed on from one generation to another"**, which implicated that Taiwan problem must be resolved in this generation. Regarding the way to resolve the problem, Xi Jinping put forward the policy of adhering to peaceful reunification and also promoted specific plans on how to govern Taiwan after further integration and reunification. At the same time, Xi Jinping expressed his firm opposition to "Taiwan independence" and did **"not promised to renounce the use of force."** This is a major shift in Taiwan's policy since the Sixteenth Congress. **All in all, as the Tsai Ing-wen government had been going further along the road of "Taiwan independence," the CCP had to respond with an increasingly tough posture.** Xi Jinping's statement on the Taiwan that time was very tough, and he clearly proposed to resolve the Taiwan issue in this generation.

### **3.3 Taiwan-related policies in China's Five-year Plans**

#### 1) The First Five-year Plan

The First Five-Year Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "First Plan") was implemented from 1953 to 1957. In July 1955, at the second meeting of the First National People's Congress, Vice Premier Li Fuchun made a report on

---

<sup>63</sup> [http://www.xinhuanet.com/tw/2019-01/02/c\\_1210028622.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/tw/2019-01/02/c_1210028622.htm)

---

the First Plan<sup>64</sup>. The main content of the report was the economic development parts of the plan.

When it came to agricultural issues, the report only mentioned Taiwan in one place. The advantage of the planned purchase and planned supply of grains formulated by the state in the first place was that it was conducive to supporting industry and national defense construction, and was conducive to supporting the "liberation of Taiwan." This indicated that the mainland was still preparing for the launch of the Taiwan campaign at that time.

## 2) The Second to the Sixth-Five Year Plan

Those plans didn't mention Taiwan or were interrupted by the Cultural Revolution.

## 3) The Seventh Five-Year Plan

In March 1986, at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, Premier Zhao Ziyang made a report on the Seventh Five-Year Plan<sup>65</sup>. The Seventh Five-Year Plan specifically mentioned the Taiwan problem and proposed to promote the peaceful reunification of the two sides of the strait in accordance with "one country, two systems."

## 4) The Eighth Five-Year Plan

In April 1991, the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People's Congress passed the outline of the Eighth Five-Year Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Eighth Plan")<sup>66</sup>. The Eighth Plan proposed to continue to adhere to the principle of "one country, two systems" and promote the "peaceful reunification" of the country. In terms of rhetoric, the outline of the Eighth Plan specifically discussed Taiwan in the "Main Tasks and Important Indicators", which indicated that the mainland attached great importance to it.

## 5) The Ninth Five-Year Plan

In March 1996, the Fourth Session of the Eighth National People's Congress approved the outline of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Ninth Plan")<sup>67</sup>. Taiwan was mentioned in two places. The first was the part

---

<sup>64</sup> [http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-03/06/content\\_910770.htm](http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-03/06/content_910770.htm)

<sup>65</sup> [http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content\\_1763.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content_1763.htm)

<sup>66</sup> [http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/28/content\\_5002538.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/28/content_5002538.htm)

<sup>67</sup> <http://www.71.cn/2011/0930/633081.shtml>

---

planning the direction of economic development in various regions. The southeast coastal areas should take fully advantage of their "adjacency to Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan" and continue to deepen their opening-up. This indicated that during the Ninth Plan period, economic construction was the theme, and opening-up to Taiwan was an important way. Second, the Ninth Plan continued the Eighth Plan's attention to Taiwan, setting up special topics to discuss peaceful reunification, and continuing to emphasize peaceful reunification.

#### 6) The Tenth Five-Year Plan

In March 2001, the Fourth Session of the Ninth National People's Congress approved the outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Tenth Plan")<sup>68</sup>. The "Tenth Plan" did not set up a special topic to discuss Taiwan or peaceful reunification, but set up a special topic to discuss national defense construction. This was the first time in any five-year plans. The discussion of Taiwan was placed under the topic of "National Defense Construction." The "Tenth Plan" proposed to adhere to "peaceful reunification, one country, two systems," **and at the same time resolutely "batter" the separatists, using tough language on Taiwan.**

#### 7) The Eleventh Five-Year Plan

In 2006, the Fourth Session of the Tenth National People's Congress approved the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Eleventh Plan") outline<sup>69</sup>. The "Eleventh Plan" continued the practice of the Tenth Plan and did not set up special topics to discuss Taiwan. The outline of the "Eleventh Plan" did not mention "peaceful reunification", but under the topic of discussing domestic governance ("Improving the Planning Management System"), it proposed to promote the great cause of reunification and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

#### 8) The Twelfth Five-Year Plan

In March 2011, the Fourth Session of the Eleventh National People's Congress approved the outline of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Twelfth Plan")<sup>70</sup>. The "Twelfth Plan" once again set up a special topic to discuss Taiwan, proposing to adhere to "peaceful reunification, one country,

---

<sup>68</sup> [http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content\\_60699.htm](http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_60699.htm)

<sup>69</sup> [http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content\\_268766.htm](http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_268766.htm)

<sup>70</sup> [http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2011-08/16/content\\_1665636.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2011-08/16/content_1665636.htm)

---

two systems," oppose separatist activities promoting "Taiwan independence" and contain them. At the same time, it proposed to support the expansion of cross-strait trade and deepen economic cooperation.

#### 9) The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan

In March 2016, the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Thirteenth Plan")<sup>71</sup> was approved by the Fourth Session of the Twelfth National People's Congress. The "Thirteenth Plan" once again set up a special topic to discuss Taiwan, and proposed to advance the "process of reunification of the motherland." At the same time, it resolutely opposed "Taiwan independence." In terms of rhetoric, the plan didn't mention "peaceful reunification", which was harsher than what the previous five-year plans had proposed.

#### 10) The Fourteenth Five-Year Plan

In March 2021, the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Fourteenth Plan") was approved by the Fourth Session of the Thirteenth National People's Congress<sup>72</sup>. The "Fourteenth Plan" also set up a special session to discuss Taiwan, and promoted the reunification of the motherland and proposed **to be highly vigilant about "Taiwan independence" separatist activities and "resolutely curb" them**. The Fourteenth Plan did not mention "peaceful reunification". Compared with what was used in the Thirteenth Plan, the rhetoric was even harsher.

### 3.4 High-level Meetings between leaders of mainland and Taiwan

The high-level meetings between leaders of mainland and Taiwan are the meetings of incumbent leaders of mainland China and Taiwan and of leaders of CCP and Taiwan's ruling party. There was only one such high-level meeting, namely the "Xi-Ma Meeting" in Singapore in November 2015. General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and President of China Xi Jinping had a meeting with the leader of the Taiwan Ma Ying-jeou. The two sides reached a consensus on continuing to adhere to the "1992 Consensus" and deepening cooperation on this basis.

---

<sup>71</sup> [http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-03/17/content\\_5054992.htm](http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-03/17/content_5054992.htm)

<sup>72</sup> [http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021lh/2021-03/05/c\\_1127173282.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021lh/2021-03/05/c_1127173282.htm)

---

### 3.5 The Conclusion

**Taiwan's mainland policy is the political bedrock that determines cross-strait relations.** All in all, they are divided into three stages:

First, from 1950 to 1981, Taiwan had adopted the policy of "counterattack to restore the country." The cross-strait relations were tense and the risks were high.

Second, from 1981 to the end of the 1990s, Taiwan had abandoned "counterattack to restore the country", and promoted cross-strait reconciliation. And the risk decreased.

Third, from the late 1990s to the present, the Taiwan authority has promoted the "two-state theory" and the "one country on each side theory". And "Taiwan independence" has been continuously promoted.

The third stage is divided into three sub-stages, corresponding to the era of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the era of Ma Ying-jeou, and the era of Tsai Ing-wen. **Except during the Ma Ying-jeou era, the Taiwan authority has been going further on the road of "Taiwan independence," which has led to the continuous increase of cross-strait risks.**

The mainland's Taiwan policies are not only responses to Taiwan's policies, but also reflections of the adjustments of the country's policies after changes in the domestic and international environment. It has been an important factor in determining cross-strait relations. In 1979, the mainland put forward the policy of "one country, two systems" to resolve the Taiwan problem peacefully, which has since been upheld. As the Taiwan authorities resisted reunification and promoted "Taiwan independence," the mainland immediately promoted military preparations against Taiwan and proposed "no promise to renounce the use of force" to maintain national unity ensuring national rejuvenation. After Tsai Ing-wen came to power, she has been going further down the road of "Taiwan independence," and the mainland has been responded with increasingly tougher rhetoric. **This is the fundamental reason why Strait risk has gradually increased in recent years.** From above parts, military factors cannot be avoided when discussing cross-strait risks. This is the topic of the next part.

---

## 4. Military Power

If political factors are indicators of national leaders' subjective preference for peace or war, military factors indicate mainland China and Taiwan's objective power. The risk of Cross-Strait relations could only be substantially influenced by the parties with both subjective preference and objective power. Military factors have multiple implications. The report selects eight second level indicators to convey Taiwan Strait's military condition.

The first one is the Cross-Strait defense strategy, which reflects the major military policies of the mainland and Taiwan. The report will analyze the defense strategies of mainland both parties and compare their military expenditures. Historically speaking, the fundamental political factor that determines Cross-Strait relations has been Taiwan's mainland policy, and Taiwan's defense policy has been the military embodiment of its mainland policy. When Taiwan's defense policy was "offensive operation", corresponding with "counterattack against the mainland" in politics, Cross-Strait relations were tense and high-risky. In contemporary times, Taiwan's defense policy tends to be defensive, while it has still emphasized to develop asymmetric warfare capabilities and resisted reunification by force. This will also lead to increased risks. Responsively, the mainland's national defense policy has to emphasize opposition to "Taiwan independence".

The second indicator is military conflicts and frictions. It is a qualitative variable to imply whether the Cross-Strait relations are intense or not. Then the report will compare the military power of the mainland and Taiwan. The average width of the Taiwan Strait is 200 kilometers and this geographical feature determines that the military conflict in the Strait is naval combat in the first place. The report selects four main naval equipment types (namely destroyers, frigates, conventional submarines, and nuclear attack submarines) and codes their quantities as the third-level indicators of both parties' naval strength. Air force is indispensable in the contemporary fight for control of the sea, so it is necessary to compare the combat power of two parties' air forces. The report chooses the amount of fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, the medium- and long-range bombers, and the scale of airborne forces to be the third level indicators reflecting actors' air force strength. The cross-sea operations also require amphibious landings. The report compares the amphibious transportation capabilities of the mainland and Taiwan by investigating the development of large landing ships, amphibious transport docks, amphibious

---

assault ships (or landing helicopter docks) and marine corps (amphibious troops).

Besides, the military comparison of the mainland and Taiwan should also cover standoff strike forces, ground forces, and reconnaissance system establishment. The report selects the number of short and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, the third-generation main battle tanks, and early warning aircrafts as the third level indicators to reflect the level of those three areas stated in the beginning.

#### **4.1 Taiwan's defense policy emphasis and mainland related factors**

Since the era of Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan authorities have published the "National Defense Report" (hereinafter referred to as the "Defense Report")<sup>73</sup>, explaining the defense strategy and the military construction situation to the public. The earliest Report available on the website of Taiwan's Defense Department is the 1992 version<sup>74</sup>.

According to 2019 Taiwan Defense Report, the military strategy of the Taiwan military has experienced six stages of evolution:

From 1949 to 1979, **offensive operations**.

From 1979 to 1989, **offensive and defensive operations as one**.

From 1989 to 2002, **defensive operations**.

From 2002 to 2009, **effective deterrence and resolute defense**.

From 2009 to 2017, **resolute defense and effective deterrence**.

From 2017 till now, **resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence**.

The report believes that when the Taiwan authorities advocated "offensive operations" or are actively preparing to resist reunification with force, or even try to assault the mainland, the risk of Cross-Strait relations would increase. When Taiwan authorities agreed to peaceful reunification and promote

---

<sup>73</sup>

<https://www.mnd.gov.tw/PublishForReport.aspx?title=%E8%BB%8D%E4%BA%8B%E5%88%8A%E7%89%A9&Types=%E6%AD%B7%E5%B9%B4%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A%E6%9B%B8%E5%B0%88%E5%8D%80&SelectStyle=%E6%AD%B7%E5%B9%B4%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A%E6%9B%B8%E5%B0%88%E5%8D%80>

<sup>74</sup>

<https://www.mnd.gov.tw/PublishForReport.aspx?title=%u8ecd%u4e8b%u520a%u7269&Types=%u6b77%u5e74%u570b%u9632%u5831%u544a%u66f8%u5c08%u5340&SelectStyle=%u6b77%u5e74%u570b%u9632%u5831%u544a%u66f8%u5c08%u5340>

---

“defensive strategy”, the risk of Cross-Strait relations would decrease. When Taiwan authorities emphasized “effective deterrence” and tried to resist reunification by force, the risk would rise again.

#### 1) 1992 National Defense Report

Released in February 1992, the report pointed out that **Taiwan’s “national interests” include “insisting on the fundamental national policy of China reunification”, but “no longer pursuing the reunification by force”**. The report suggested that the primary threat to Taiwan was the “infringement of Chinese Communist Party”, but the mainland was not capable of “invading Taiwan”. Taiwan authorities understood that once Taiwan moves towards “independence”, it would lead to a Cross-Strait war. The “war preparedness” of Taiwan military has six aspects: precise drill, striving for strategic depth, enhancing rapid response, preserving decisive combat strength, establishing deterrent force, and continuing solid preparedness. Taiwan would not take the initiative to stimulate the deterioration of Cross-Strait relations, but it would seek to frustrate the mainland’s attack and effectively defend Taiwan.

#### 2) 1994 National Defense Report

Published in March 1994, the report stated that the biggest threat of Taiwan was “the military invasion of Chinese Communist Party”. The most important defense goal of Taiwan authorities was to defeat the mainland’s “intention to invade Taiwan”. The significance of “pursuing the peaceful reunification of China” had decreased. Taiwan authorities have estimated that the mainland’s “capacity to invade Taiwan” had increased. Taiwan military adopted a “defensive strategy”. The “navy” and “air force” must purchase and manufacture advanced equipment to ensure air and sea control over the Taiwan Strait. The Army must attach importance to anti-landing combat capabilities.

#### 3) 1996 National Defense Report

Published in May 1996, the reported stated that Taiwan authorities continue to pursue “a unified country of the Three Principles of the People”. The Taiwan authorities believed that the greatest threat to Taiwan was still the “military invasion of Chinese Communist Party”. The report stated that the People’s Liberation Army “already has the ability to conduct surprise attack and its threat to Taiwan is rising”. Taiwan promoted the guiding ideology of “**resolute defense and effective deterrence**”, “**no provocation, no evasion**”, “avoiding

---

the war but no fear to it, preparing for the war by no provocation to it, taking the initiative rather than passive”, in order to ensure Taiwan’s position as “renaissance base”. The report thought that “deterrence” strategy in essence mean to resist reunification by force, which was Taiwan’s military strategy of obstructing peaceful reunification. Taiwan armed force needed to “actively prepare for the necessary force”, “air and sea control is the priority, anti-blockade is the precedence, and decisive victory on beached is the key”. It was indicated that the preparatory battlefields of the Taiwan armed forces are on various beaches around the island.

#### 4) 1998 National Defense Report

Released in March 1998, the report stated that Taiwan authorities’ national goals at this stage include “**reunifying the country peacefully**”. The most serious threat currently was still the “military invasion of Chinese Communist Party”. Therefore, the primary goal of the Taiwan armed force was to “prevent the surprise attack of Chinese Communist and win the war as soon as possible”. The strategic vision of the Taiwan armed force was still “resolute defense and effective deterrence”, “no provocation, no evasion”, and to maintain the capability of “emergency response” and “rapid response”. Since 1997, Taiwan began a force reduction and promotion plan Jingshi Program. Taiwan authorities believed that the PLA Navy’s amphibious transportation was capable of delivering a reinforced division at one time.

#### 5) 2000 National Defense Report

The report was released in August 2000. After the leaders of the Taiwan authorities proposed the “two-state theory”, the Cross-Strait relations “turned into a state of tension and depression”. After the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macao, the reunification of Taiwan became “urgent”. **The 2000 report did not mention any “national reunification” goals.** The primary task of Taiwan military was still to prevent the “military invasion of Chinese Communist Party”. The Taiwan authorities believed that Taiwan’s navy and air force still had advantages in the Taiwan Strait, but once the mainland controlled the air and sea, it could deliver a reinforced division at one time. Taiwan’s military strategy was adjusted to “effective deterrence and resolute defense”, which emphasizes the importance of deterrence to the mainland. Taiwan armed force believed that its military capability was advanced enough to “take initiative”. Taiwan military needed to enhance the capability of “air control, sea control, and counter-landing”.

---

#### 6) 2002 National Defense Report

When the report was released in July 2002, Chen Shui-bian, head of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), had already assumed the office and promoted “Taiwan independence” policy. This report **overlooked “national reunification” in “national goals”**. Taiwan authorities believed that the mainland was threatening Taiwan from political, military, psychological, and economic perspectives. The situation was quite intense because the mainland is “assaulting Taiwan with soft power and terrifying Taiwan with hard power”. Taiwan’s strategy started to turn from “passive defense” to “active defense”.<sup>75</sup> Taiwan authorities emphasized to “prevent war”, “maintain Cross-Strait peace”, “defend national security”, “effective deterrence and resolute defense”, and promote military capacity. **Taiwan military underlined “sea and air superiority”, “defeating enemy gradually”, and “annihilating enemy on the beaches and airborne landing areas”**.

#### 7) 2004 National Defense Report

The report was released in December 2004. Taiwan authorities thought that although the Cross-Strait relations were getting worse, it still unlikely would lead to a war in short term. In the long run, if the “military power between the mainland and Taiwan become unbalanced”, the mainland might launch a war of reunification. If Taiwan’s armed force could not be effectively transformed, the mainland would gain the advantage in the Taiwan Strait from 2006, and the military power of both sides would be out of balance in 2008. The mainland’s strategy was to “win quickly in a long-distance battle, and to determine victory in the first combat”. The mainland’s amphibious force could deliver one reinforced division every time. When facing the “military pressure of Chinese Communist Party”, Taiwan authorities needed to “build up national defense forces to defend national security”. Taiwan armed force needed “modernized transformation”, but the progress lagged because of insufficient funds. Taiwan military insisted on “effective deterrence and resolute defense” and expected to “prevent war and conflict”. Since 2004, Taiwan army began to promote the Jingjin Program to improve training and upgrade capabilities.

#### 8) 2006 National Defense Report

The report was released in August 2006. Chen Shui-bian administration continued to promote “Taiwan independence” policy while the mainland

---

<sup>75</sup> See in 2004 Taiwan National Defense Report, p24.

---

passed the *Anti-Secession Law*. Taiwan authorities took it as a signal of more deteriorated and intricate Cross-Strait relations. The armed forces of the mainland were “upgrading military preparations to Taiwan” and the “military threat is increasing”. Its strategy was to “win quickly in a long-distance battle, and to determine victory in the first combat”. Taiwan military continued to its “active defense” strategy and reiterate “effective deterrence and resolute defense”. It continued to promote Jingjin Program, which sought “digital, multi-dimensional, and mechanized” ground force and “effective, efficient, swift, and long-distance capable” naval force, and “early warning, preventing surprise attack, and long-distance capable” air force. The Artillery Command was established under the Republic of China Armed Forces Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC), responsible for anti-missile combat of Taiwan.

#### 9) 2008 National Defense Report

The report was released in May 2008, which is the last defense report of Chen Shui-bian administration. Taiwan authorities thought that the Cross-Strait relations have been keeping deteriorating and the mainland continues to prepare “national reunification by force”. Moreover, the mainland was building Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capability in order to stop America’s interference in Taiwan Strait. Taiwan authorities thought that “Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had gained the advantage in Cross-Strait military competition” and the so called “military threat” of CCP was increasing. The strategic vision of Taiwan remained as “Resolute Defense, Effective Deterrence”. “Effective deterrence” meant to build the “defense force” that could threat and restrain the mainland. “Resolute defense” meant that once the threatening and restraint failed, Taiwan military could fight back and “guard territory”. According to Taiwan’s strategic vision, the Jingjin Program would be insisted. The army, navy and air force would be reformed for “integrated combat capability” to “**deter enemy from the beginning**” and to eliminate the “first group of enemy troops”. This could be understood that Taiwan’s presupposed battlefield was in the mainland. Therefore, the final goal is still “defeating enemy on the beach”.

#### 10) 2009 National Defense Report

The report was published in January 2009. When Kuomintang’s Ma Ying-jeou came to power, Taiwan authorities recognized the “1992 Consensus” and the report pointed out that the Cross-Strait situation was “improving visibly”. Even if the Kuomintang came to power again, Taiwan’s defense policy did not return

---

to what it was in the early 1990s, nor did it reiterate the “pursuit of China’s reunification”. The report estimated that the Cross-Strait military advantage has already gained by the mainland, which led to its continuously “focusing on military deployments against Taiwan” threatening Taiwan’s security. Taiwan strategic concept turned to “**resolute defense and credible deterrence**”, adhering to the concept of “preventing war but not fearing war, and preparing for war but not provoking war”, aiming to “ensure the nation’s livelihood and development”. Due to the unbalanced military power between the mainland and Taiwan, the importance of “resolute defense” had increased. “Strategically,

Taiwan armed forces “will assume a defensive posture”, in order to survive the mainland’s attack first and then strive for a better situation. “Credible deterrence” served “resolute defense” and “deterrence” was less important now. This implied the improvement of the Cross-Strait relations. Following the Jingjin Program, Taiwan authorities promoted the Jingsui Program and continued military reforms, emphasizing anti-missile, air control, sea control, and sovereignty defense. The military was further scaled down and **developed “asymmetrical warfare capabilities”**.

#### 11) 2011 National Defense Report

Released in July 2011, the report judged that “cross-Strait relations have gradually relaxed,” and that “contact and exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have greatly reduced the possibility of armed conflict”. The Taiwan authorities claimed that the mainland had not stopped military preparations against Taiwan and its strategy had been upgraded from “using military force to oppose Taiwan independence” to “opposing Taiwan independence and advancing the unity of China”. The mainland had not “adjusted its concepts of intimidation and unification” of Taiwan, and “the PRC’s threat to Taiwan remains unabated”. However, the PLA had “not yet fully equipped to launch a full scale invasion of Taiwan as it still has insufficient amphibious transport equipment”. Ma Ying-jeou proposed the idea of “institutionalized cross-Strait reconciliation” to govern Taiwan military arrangement. Adhering to this idea, Taiwan military insisted on the strategy of “resolute defense and credible deterrence”, “defensive countermeasures capabilities will continue to be enhanced”, building “hard ROC” force, and means of “credible deterrence” would work to achieve the objective of “resolute defense”. Taiwan military continued to develop Jingsui Program, scaling down the military forces while maintaining combat capabilities. It also emphasized

---

“Information and Electronic Warfare”, “Joint Counter Air Operations”, “Joint Sea Control Operations”, and “Homeland Defense”. Taiwan gave up to “deter enemy from the beginning”, while turned to “anchorage and beachhead attack” and “asymmetric operations”. The area of warfare was limited to Taiwan.

#### 12) 2013 National Defense Report

Released in October 2013, the report stated that the Cross-Strait situation continued to ease, but the mainland “has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan” and remained Taiwan’s “greatest threat”. It suggested that “the PLA has the ability to intimidate Taiwan with military force”. And it had gained “superior naval and air support” and the advantage was growing. The mainland “plans to build comprehensive capabilities for using military force against Taiwan by 2020”. Taiwan had been aware of the widening military gap between the mainland and itself. Thus, on the one hand, it proposed to ease the Cross-Strait relations and tried to avoid conflicts. On the other hand, Taiwan continued to promote the Jingsui Program aiming to build an “innovative/asymmetric” armed force. Taiwan military insisted on the military concept of “resolute defense, credible deterrence”. It adopted “passive defense strategy” while hoped to “defeat enemy forces at the beachhead”.

#### 13) 2015 National Defense Report

The report was released in October 2015. During Ma Ying-jeou administration, the communication between the mainland and Taiwan was improved and their relations had been gradually easing, Taiwan authorities still regarded the mainland’s “military threat” as the “leading challenge”. Taiwan believed that “the PRC has acquired all-time surveillance capabilities in areas to the west of the first island chain”, to occupy Taiwan’s offshore islands and outlying islands, to control the area in the west of the first island chain, and to launch “large-scale joint firepower strikes and deter external military from intervening in any Taiwan Strait disputes”. But PLA hadn’t completed “the establishment of a formidable military arsenal for conducting military operations against Taiwan”. The report conveyed that the PLA would be prepared by 2020. Facing the mainland’s “challenge”, Taiwan authorities admitted that there was a big gap of the military power between the mainland and Taiwan and Taiwan was not able to bridge the gap. Taiwan military insisted the concept of “resolute defense and credible deterrence” while proposing to develop “a small but superb, strong, and smart defense force”. It aimed to develop “innovative/asymmetric” and “hard ROC” military forces. Taiwan authorities attached importance to the

---

integrated combat capabilities of air, ground, and navy forces. The navy force should “achieve regional maritime superiority”, the air force should “strive for air superiority”. They should conduct “joint interdiction” to annihilate “enemy at anchorage areas and beach heads”.

#### 14) 2017 National Defense Report

The report was released in December 2017. When Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016, the Cross-Strait relations became tense. The report gave up rhetoric like “relaxed”. Taiwan authorities thought that “military threat from the PRC” remained as its “biggest security challenge”. The report pointed out that the military imbalance in Taiwan Strait continued to grow and the PLA’s advantage continues to expand. In 2016, the mainland carried out military reforms, changing the military regions into theater command, highlighting the overall and multi-domain warfare strategy. Taiwan authorities believed that the mainland’s capability of intelligence and reconnaissance had been advanced enough to include “all the area west of the second island chain”. Its navy has gained the capability to “resist adversary forces and block and control the Taiwan Strait”. Its ground force had gained the amphibious warfare capability to occupy Taiwan’s offshore islands and outlying islands. Its air force was able to “achieve air supremacy in the area west of the first island chain”. The PLA was more advanced in both military preparation against Taiwan and regional combat capability. Facing the mainland’s threat, Taiwan army adhered to the strategy of “**resolute defense, multi-domain deterrence**”, “achieve the objective of resolute defense through the means of multi-domain deterrence”. Taiwan military emphasized “the concept of asymmetric warfare” aiming to foster its strengths and circumvent weaknesses by attacking the mainland’s “center of gravity and critical weakness”. Besides annihilating the enemy in the beach area”, **it also emphasized “preservation of warfighting capability, pursuing decisive victory in the littoral area” to “break up the attack and block enemy landing forces”**. **It presupposed the battlefield to be closer to the mainland.**

#### 15) 2019 National Defense Report

The report was released in September 2019. The Cross-Strait situation continued to deteriorate. Taiwan authorities believed that the mainland had “growing military pressure”, “posing a serious threat to our national security”. Compared with previous years, Taiwan authorities believed that the mainland had made the greatest progress in the reconnaissance and early warning

---

system, which “is now capable of monitoring dynamic air and maritime status on the western side of the second island chain”. This was considered as a quantitative change. Taiwan authorities believed that the mainland’s amphibious warfare capabilities were insufficient to attack Taiwan Island. Taiwan military adhered to concept of “resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence”. The air and navy forces had purchased and developed new equipment. Taiwan aimed to “construct a multi-layered defense in depth by exploiting geographic features such as channels and trenches”. The final victory would be determined firstly in the sea, then there would be “decisive battle in littoral zone, and destruction of enemy at landing beach”.

#### **4.2 The mainland’s defense policy emphasis and Taiwan-related factors**

##### 1) 1998 White Paper on National Defense

The mainland would publish a white paper on national defense every few years. The earliest version could trace back to 1998.<sup>76</sup> The white paper stated that the mainland respected the “**defensive national defense policy**” and “prioritize national sovereignty, reunification, territorial integrity, and security”. The mainland promoted “the active defense of military strategy”. The key points of the white paper included reducing the size of the military by half a million, military support for national development, etc. Taiwan was not mentioned.

##### 2) 2000 White Paper on National Defense

Released in October 2000<sup>77</sup>, the white paper suggested that peace and development were trends of the times and the Asia-Pacific situation was generally stable. The mainland would pursue a national defense policy that was defensive in nature and adopted the military strategic guideline adhering to active defense. Particularly, the white paper mentioned to “endeavor to solve historical issue with peaceful measures”. Regarding Taiwan issue, the white paper pointed out that the mainland would basically solve the issue under the principle of “peaceful unification” and “one country, two systems”, but it did not rule out the “use of force” to maintain national integrity. In response to the Lee Teng-hui’s “two-states theory”, **the white paper warned**

---

<sup>76</sup>

<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Admin/1998%20White%20Paper%20-%20Chinese.pdf>

<sup>77</sup> [http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content\\_61220.htm](http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_61220.htm)

---

that “Taiwan independence” would mean “restarting the war”.

### 3) 2002 White Paper on National Defense

The white paper released in December 2002 stated that the mainland would pursue a defensive national defense policy and adopt the military strategic guideline adhering to active defense. In this white paper, Taiwan issue gained more attention. The purpose of mainland defense policy was “prevent secession and reunite China”.<sup>78</sup> The white paper reiterated “peaceful unification” and “one country, two systems” while stating that “would never promise to abandon the use of force”. **The white paper stated that mainland’s armed forces “have the determination and capability to prevent any secession actions”.**

### 4) 2004 White Paper on National Defense

The white paper was released in December 2004. It stated that the mainland would pursue a national defense policy that was defensive in nature and adopted the military strategic guideline adhering to active defense. It was mentioned by the white paper for the first time that the mainland should “strengthen the combat capabilities of naval force, air force, and the Second Artillery Force”. The white paper also mentioned the necessity to facilitate military reform and “**make intense preparations for military operations**”. Since Chen Shui-bian proposed the concept of “one country on each side” then, the white paper indicated that “the Cross-Strait relations are severe”. In the “National Defense Policy” chapter, Taiwan was particularly mentioned along with the warning that if it “takes risks” of creating major “Taiwan independence” issue, **the mainland military would thoroughly smash the conspiracy “at all costs”.**

### 5) 2006 White Paper on National Defense

The white paper was released in December 2004, stating that the mainland would pursue a national defense policy that was defensive in nature and adopted the military strategic guideline adhering to active defense. The navy should “gradually expand the strategic depth of offshore defense”, the air force should “accelerate the transition from homeland air defense to integrated offense and defense capabilities”, and the Second Artillery Force should “gradually improve the force system of both nuclear and conventional

---

<sup>78</sup> [http://www.gov.cn/zwqk/2005-05/26/content\\_1384.htm](http://www.gov.cn/zwqk/2005-05/26/content_1384.htm)

---

weapons”. Regarding Taiwan issue, the white paper pointed out that “oppose and contain “Taiwan independence” separatists and their activities”. **The struggle against “Taiwan independence” was “complicated and severe”, and the military must resolutely safeguard national unity.** In terms of rhetoric, the 2006 white paper was somewhat relaxed, and did not mention “not giving up using military force” to solve the Taiwan issue.

#### 6) 2008 White Paper on National Defense

Released in January 2009<sup>79</sup>, the white paper stated that the mainland would pursue a national defense policy that was defensive in nature and adopted the military strategic guideline adhering to active defense. “Obey the self-defensive stance and use military forces cautiously”. The priority of national defense remained safeguarding national unity. In accordance with the requirement of “offshore defense”, the PLA Navy should build a “naval equipment system that integrates sea and air forces and that is capable of offshore defense operations”. The air force should “start the transition from homeland air defense to integrated offense and defense capabilities”, establishing the equipment system that combines ground and air forces and is capable of defense and offense operations”. At that time, the government of DPP, which pursued the “Taiwan independence” goal, had stepped down and the Kuomintang (KMT) came to power. The situation across the Taiwan Straits eased. The white paper claimed that **“major positive changes have taken place in the situation across the Taiwan Straits”** and **“Cross-Strait relations have improved and developed”**.

#### 7) 2010 White Paper on National Defense

Released in March 2011<sup>80</sup>, the white paper stated that that China would pursue a national defense policy that was defensive in nature and adopted the military strategic guideline adhering to active defense. The priority of national defense remained safeguarding national unity. The navy was responsible for “offshore defense”, the air force “integrated offense and defense capabilities”, and the Second Artillery Force emphasized “precision strike”. The mainland armed forces continued to highlight opposing “Taiwan independence” separatists. The white paper suggested that the Cross-Strait relations continue to improve and “a series of agreements have been reached”.

---

<sup>79</sup> [http://www.gov.cn/zwgc/2009-01/20/content\\_1210224.htm](http://www.gov.cn/zwgc/2009-01/20/content_1210224.htm)

<sup>80</sup> [http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-03/31/content\\_1835289.htm](http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-03/31/content_1835289.htm)

---

#### 8) 2013 White Paper on National Defense

In April 2013, the State Council published *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*<sup>81</sup>. The mainland “unswervingly” stuck to defensive national defense policy and “unswervingly implement” the military strategy of active defense. The priority of national defense remained safeguarding national unity while the second priority was to “win local wars under the conditions of informationization”. The navy was responsible for “offshore defense”, the air force “integrated offense and defense capabilities”, and the Second Artillery Force emphasized “precision strike”. The white paper rarely mentioned Taiwan but stating that the “cross-Straits relations are sustaining a momentum of peaceful development”.

#### 9) 2015 White Paper on National Defense

The State Council issued *China's Military Strategy* in May 2015<sup>82</sup>. The white paper took a positive view of the world situation because “the forces for world peace are on the rise, as so are the factors against war”. The mainland stuck to defensive national defense policy and advocated the military strategy of active defense. It unprecedentedly stated that the military must insist on “unity of strategic defense and operational and tactical offense”. The navy was responsible for “offshore waters defense” as well as “open seas protection”, the air force continued to integrate offensive and defense capabilities, and the Second Artillery Force was required to be “lean and effective and possessing both nuclear and conventional missiles” and “will continue to keep an appropriate level of vigilance in peacetime”. In 2015, the mainland launched the military reform in response to the new situation. The center of military forces was “winning informationized wars” and to “highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS (preparation for military struggle)”, aiming to “get ready to safeguard national sovereignty and security”. The white paper confirmed the positive achievement of the Cross-Strait relations, saying that “Cross-Taiwan Strait relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development”. But according to the white paper's statement of military reform, the PLA's military preparations have not eased at all.

#### 10) 2019 White Paper on National Defense

The State Council issued *China's National Defense in the New Era* in July

---

<sup>81</sup> [http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2013-04/16/content\\_2379013.htm](http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2013-04/16/content_2379013.htm)

<sup>82</sup> <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2015/Document/1435161/1435161.htm>

---

2019<sup>83</sup>. The white paper illustrated that the international strategic landscape was going through “profound changes”. “International strategic competition is on the rise”, “global military competition is intensifying”, and the mainland was facing series of “threats and challenges”. China would pursue a national defense policy that was defensive in nature and adopted the military strategic guideline adhering to active defense. Based on 2015 white paper, the new version placed emphasis on “both containing and winning wars”, and underscored “the unity of strategic defense and offense at operational and tactical levels”. The priority of national defense remained safeguarding national unity. The navy aimed at “offshore waters defense and open seas protection”, the air force aimed at “integrating air and space capabilities as well as coordinating offensive and defensive operations”, and the PLA Rocket Force was required to “having both nuclear and conventional capabilities and deterring wars in all battlespaces”. When Tsai Ing-wen administration came to power in 2016, the Cross-Strait relations intensified again, so the white paper has more about Taiwan. The white paper stated that **“China must be and will be reunited”** and **after a decade it severely reiterated that “makes no promise to renounce the use of force” and would safeguard national unity “at all costs”**.

#### **4.3 Military Expenditure of the mainland China and Taiwan**

Military expenditure is a pivotal indicator that on one hand, it directly reveals the national defense policy while on the other hand, it determines the military force development by providing material basis to it. Discussion on military expenditure is inevitable when analyzing the defense policies of the mainland and Taiwan and comparing their military forces.

The military expenditure of the mainland and Taiwan on record since 1950. See Table 2.

---


<sup>83</sup> [http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-07/24/c\\_1124792450.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-07/24/c_1124792450.htm)

Year	mainland in hundreds of millions of USD	Taiwan in hundreds of millions of USD	mainland in hundreds of millions of RMB	Taiwan in hundreds of millions of NTD
1950	10		28	
1951	24		53	
1952	26		58	
1953	29		75	
1954	22		58	
1955	25		65	
1956	23		61	
1957	21		55	
1958	19		50	
1959	22		58	
1960	22		58	
1961	20		50	
1962	23		57	
1963	27		66	
1964	30		73	
1965	35		87	
1966	41		101	
1967	34		83	
1968	38		94	
1969	51		126	
1970	59		145	
1971	69		169	
1972	71		159	
1973	66		145	
1974	60		133	
1975	72		142	
1976	68		134	
1977	81		149	
1978	98		168	
1979	144		223	
1980	130		194	
1981	95		168	
1982	91		176	
1983	90		177	
1984	82		181	
1985	65		192	
1986	58		201	
1987	56	49	210	1,553
1988	59	58	218	1,670
1989	67	71	251	1,879
1990	61	79	290	2,110
1991	62	85	330	2,271
1992	69	95	378	2,394
1993	74	96	426	2,535
1994	64	92	551	2,425
1995	76	88	637	2,341
1996	87	89	720	2,441
1997	98	87	813	2,534
1998	113	77	935	2,571
1999	130	82	1,076	2,632
2000	146	86	1,207	2,685
2001	174	70	1,442	2,377
2002	206	65	1,708	2,252
2003	231	66	1,908	2,277
2004	266	75	2,200	2,489
2005	302	77	2,475	2,485
2006	374	73	2,979	2,371
2007	467	78	3,554	2,567
2008	601	90	4,177	2,824
2009	704	88	4,806	2,912
2010	765	88	5,176	2,768
2011	902	97	5,829	2,842
2012	1,029	103	6,506	3,034
2013	1,163	97	7,201	2,890
2014	1,310	96	8,082	2,914
2015	1,410	96	8,869	3,060
2016	1,434	96	9,544	3,098
2017	1,550	102	10,444	3,079
2018	1,669	105	11,070	3,159
2019	1,724	107	11,899	3,295
2020	1,840	117	12,680	3,435
2021	2,127	125	13,795	3,523

(Table 3: The defense budget of the mainland and Taiwan from 1950 to 2021.)

The resource of the mainland's defense budget in Table 2 is Xinhua News and the State Council. Data of Taiwan is retrieved from the "Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics"<sup>84</sup>. For the convenience of comparison, the report converts the value of RMB and New Taiwan dollars into US dollars at the average exchange rate of that year. It should be noted that the data span several decades, and there is difficulty tracking currency value changes in such a long time. When converting into US dollars, there have been changes in the value of US dollar and the exchange rate. Before 1973, the US had adopted the Bretton Woods System under which 35 US dollars equaled one ounce of gold. After 1973, the Bretton Woods system was abandoned, and US dollar has experienced great changes in value and even in nature. These factors make it difficult to compare the defense spending of the mainland and Taiwan. This report aims to demonstrate the big picture combining existing research on military expenditures of the mainland and Taiwan.

The first point of attention is the overall trend. With the economic development of the mainland and Taiwan, their defense budgets have been increasing. Over the past decades, the mainland's military expenditure has increased rapidly and significantly, while Taiwan's military expenditure has increased at a slower rate and with smaller scale.



(Figure 1: The Military Expenditure of the mainland and Taiwan from 1950 to 2021)

<sup>84</sup> <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=26269&CtNode=5389&mp=1>

As shown in Figure 1, since 1998, the mainland's military expenditure has started exponential growth with a steep curve. In contrast, Taiwan's military expenditure has increased but the changes have been gentle.

Year	The Military Expenditure Gap between the mainland and Taiwan
1987	7.34
1988	0.27
1989	(4.73)
1990	(17.92)
1991	(22.83)
1992	(26.59)
1993	(22.32)
1994	(27.85)
1995	(12.04)
1996	(2.28)
1997	10.58
1998	35.99
1999	48.34
2000	60.03
2001	104.01
2002	141.02
2003	164.26
2004	190.93
2005	224.92
2006	300.75
2007	389.13
2008	511.82
2009	615.26
2010	676.47
2011	805.89
2012	926.32
2013	1065.49
2014	1213.74
2015	1313.95
2016	1337.54
2017	1448.52
2018	1564.28
2019	1616.85
2020	1723.33
2021	2001.41

(Table 4: The Military Expenditure Gap between the mainland and Taiwan from

---

1987 to 2021)

The second point of attention is the military expenditure gap between the mainland and Taiwan. It is illustrated that for a long period of time in the 1980s and 1990s, the military expenditures of the mainland and Taiwan had been almost the same and Taiwan's expenditure had been even higher than the mainland's. Since 2001, the mainland's military expenditure began to surpass Taiwan. In 2010s, the gap between the mainland and Taiwan amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars and this was a gap that Taiwan authorities were not able to bridge. The military expenditure gap between the mainland and Taiwan echoed their contrast of military capacities. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the mainland's military expenditure surpassing Taiwan was coherent with the mainland's military power surpassing Taiwan.

The report believes that when military expenditure difference between the mainland and Taiwan was relatively minor, their military capacities were close and neither of them could take the advantage, so the risk of massive wars was low. When one party's military expenditure exceeded another and the situation lasted for a long period, the party with more expenditure would take advantage and the risk of Cross-Strait relations would increase.

#### **4.4 Military conflicts of the mainland and Taiwan**

The military conflicts of the mainland and Taiwan is a qualitative variable, consisting of series of events. Since 1950, the military conflicts between the mainland and Taiwan could be divided into two stages. Stage one: 1950s to 1970s. In this stage, Taiwan Kuomintang advocated "counterattack against the mainland" policy and adopted "offensive operations" as its defense strategy. It attacked the mainland constantly and provoked wars in Taiwan Strait. The PLA launched counterattack in self-defense, took the coastal islands of the mainland, and destroyed the offshore islands bases used by Taiwan to launch attacks at the mainland. Important events at this stage include:

The Bombing of Shanghai by Kuomintang Air Force in February 1950, causing massive civilian casualties.

The Battle of Zhoushan Islands in May 1950, ending up with the mainland taking Zhoushan islands.

The "Formosa Crisis" in 1954, also known as the "First Taiwan Strait Crisis".

The Battle of Yijiangshan Islands in January 1955, resulting in the PLA taking

---

Yijiangshan Islands.

The Battle of Dachen Archipelago in February 1955.

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Battle of Liaoluo Bay in 1958.

Taiwan authorities started “Haiwei Action” in 1963, conducting special operations towards the mainland.

Battle of Dongshan Island in 1965.

Frequent conflicts are a direct manifestation of tensions in the Cross-Strait relations.

The second stage is from the 1980s to the present. In 1981, Taiwan authorities formally gave up “counterattack against the mainland” and stopped the military operations against the mainland. Since the mainland has always emphasized “peaceful reunification”, the Cross-Strait wars have been eliminated until now. The second stage can be further divided into two sub-stages.

The first sub-stage was when the military capabilities of the mainland and Taiwan were balanced. However, due to the “Taiwan independence” policy pursued by the Taiwan authorities, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis broke out in 1996.

In the second sub-stage, the mainland gained the military advantage and the PLA navy and air force conducted trainings circling Taiwan. Taiwan defined those events as “incursions” which were counted as frictions.

In September 2020, Taiwan Ministry of National Defense started the channel of “Military News Update”, recording the mainland’s sorties into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). **Taiwan defense department claimed that Chinese jets made record of 380 incursions in 2020. Until 19 April 2021, there were 80 times.** The most serious “incursions”, as Taiwan authorities claimed, were the mainland’s the air and naval training circling Taiwan. According to the statistics of Taiwan’s “air force”, the mainland’s around-the-island patrols with aircrafts started from 2015 for 4 times, followed by 4 times in 2016, 34 times in 2017, and 13 times in 2018. Then, due to the “regularization” of the patrols, Taiwan authorities stopped releasing the news. **On 3 April 2021, the mainland’s aircraft carrier Liaoning led naval exercise off Taiwan.** The frequent activities of the mainland’s aircrafts and warships imply the increasing tense of the Cross-Strait relations.

---

#### 4.5 Military Power Comparison of the mainland and Taiwan

As stated above, political factors and military factors are essential in understanding the risks of the Cross-Strait relations. The major policies and leaders' preferences indicate the intentions of decision makers while the military strength indicates the power. The influential factors of military strength are multilevel. Due to the substantial complexities between the mainland and Taiwan, this report simplifies military strength issue by comparing their amphibious transportation capabilities, air force power, standoff attack capabilities, main battle equipment of the ground force, and the establishment of intelligence and reconnaissance system.

Taiwan authorities pitched the catchphrase dubbed "counterattack the mainland" from 1950s to 1970, and then advocated "resolute defense" policy intended to resist the reunification by force. The mainland has been adhering to "peaceful unification" and "one country, two systems", but it makes no promise to renounce the use of force. The PLA has never stopped the military preparations for Taiwan. Both parties are striving for the military advantages.

There is a Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and the mainland, with an average width of 200 kilometers. Therefore, the priority of military combat between the mainland and Taiwan is to gain the naval dominance, which relies on destroyers, frigates, submarines, and the combat capabilities of naval forces. Nowadays, naval dominance and air supremacy are closely related. Thus, the report should take two parties' air force comparison into consideration, which could be simplified by comparing their fourth-generation fighters and bombers.

Amphibious warfare capability is necessary for Taiwan both for its "counterattack the mainland" and safeguarding its offshore islands. The mainland's military preparations to Taiwan should be able not only to gain the naval dominance and air supremacy of Taiwan and the surrounding areas, but also to transport ground combat forces to the island. Investigating two parties' amphibious transportation capabilities could be simplified by investigating their size of landing ship fleet, amphibious transport dock fleet, and Marine Corps (and army amphibious troops).

Taiwan has developed various standoff weapons in order to stop the march of the mainland to the greatest extent. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the development of such weapons, i.e., the development of short and medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The mainland's Strategic Rocket Force has assumed the responsibility of A2/AD. Another important

---

factor in the mainland's military preparations against Taiwan independence is to prevent foreign troops from entering the Taiwan Strait.

Finally, whether it is the Taiwan authorities' "resisting reunification by force" or the mainland's punishment of "Taiwan independence" parties, it will involve a decisive battle between the heavy army units from both sides. The report simplifies this problem to analysis of the serving amount of third-generation main battle tanks.

For the comparison of military strength between the mainland and Taiwan, see Appendix 1. The data comes from the China Military Power reports by United States Department of Defense<sup>85</sup>, the defense report of the Taiwan authorities, relevant reports from the US Congressional Research Service, and reports from public media.

**There are 16 third-level indicators of cross-strait military strength, and coding standard is: they wider the gap of a kind of equipment, the greater the risk; otherwise the opposite.**

1) The Comparison of Naval Main Battle Force Between Mainland and Taiwan

In view of the history and current situation of the mainland and Taiwan's navies, the report selects the amount of four kinds of main combat equipment: destroyers, frigates, conventional submarines, and nuclear attack submarines as the third-level indicators. These four types of warships played a leading role in the battle for sea dominance in the Taiwan Strait.

The comparison of the destroyer fleets from both sides is divided into two periods by the year 2000 with obvious characteristics. In the first period, from 1950 to 1999, Taiwan had more destroyers. In the 1970s, there was a significant gap between the two sides. The mainland navy had only four Anshan-class destroyers, and Type 051 destroyers had been gradually entering service by a slow pace. With the delivery of retired "Arizona-class" and "Fletcher-class" retired warships by the United States, Taiwan had formed the "Yang" series destroyer fleet, with more than 20 ships. That was when the gap had been the widest in the first period. The huge destroyer fleet was the foundation of Chiang Kai-shek's control of Taiwan, and it was also the bedrock urging the Taiwan authorities to persist in pursuing a "counterattack against the

---

<sup>85</sup> <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Publications/Search/CHina/>

---

mainland" strategy.

In 1980s and 1990s, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had closed the destroyer gap as Type 051 destroyers continuously entered service, and with the delivery of new Type 052 destroyers and Sovremenny class destroyers from Russia. After 2000, the mainland's destroyer fleet surpassed Taiwan's in size. In May 2021, the mainland has 38 destroyers in active service, among which there are new warships such as Type 052C, Type 052D, Type 055 equipped with vertical launch systems, phased array radars, and automated command and control systems. The Taiwan Navy only has our US-made "Kidd-class" destroyers (Taiwan called "Keelung-class"), and the mainland destroyer fleet has absolute advantages in both quantity and quality.

For most of the time, the mainland has a greater frigate fleet which has long been several times bigger than Taiwan's. However, before the Type 053 "Yingtian" entered service in 1973, the mainland frigate fleet had a large number of antique warships from Japan and the United Kingdom. The types were various and tonnages were small with poor combat effectiveness, which had reduced the frigate fleet's advantages over Taiwan's. In the 1970s, as the domestically-made Type 053 frigates entered service, the quality of the mainland frigates gradually improved. In 2005, the Type 054 entered service. In 2010, Type 054A and Type 056 entered service in large numbers, and the number of frigates of the mainland navy exceeded 100, which formed an absolute advantage over Taiwan.

In terms of conventional submarines, the PLAN has always maintained an absolute advantage.

In 1974, the Type 091 "Long March 1" (401) entered service, which was the first nuclear attack submarine of the mainland Navy. In the following decades, the mainland has commissioned more models like Type 093 and Type 093A. In view of the fact that the Taiwan Navy has not held a nuclear submarine so far, the nuclear submarine force of the Mainland Navy has taken absolute advantage since 1974.

The report believes that in 2021, the main battle forces of the mainland navy have an absolute advantage and are able to seize the dominance in Taiwan Strait.

2) The Comparison of the Amphibious Delivery Capabilities from Mainland and Taiwan

---

The report selected four third-level indicators: the amount of large landing ships, the amount of dock landing ships, the amount of amphibious assault ships (or landing helicopter docks), and the amount of divisions and brigade combat teams of Marine Corps and Army amphibious troops.

In the 1950s, the Taiwan authorities had attempted to "counter-attack the mainland," and in recent decades, Taiwan has been attempting to defend its outlying islands. Therefore a transporting and landing ship fleet has been necessary. The mainland "does not promise to give up the use of force" to solve the Taiwan problem and PLA needs transport and landing ship fleet to land its troops on the island of Taiwan. If one side had not enough landing ships, even if the side could seize control of the sea and air over the strait, it would face insurmountable difficulties in launching large-scale military operations. Therefore, the amount of landing ships and transport ships on both sides of the strait is an important indicator reflecting the maritime power of them.

There is a great demand for heavy weapons in modern warfare, thus large landing ships and dock landing ships are important. The report selects the amount of these two types of ships as indicators.

First, the report compares the size of both landing fleets.

Large landing ships.

The evolution of the trend is divided by the year 2000. Before 2000, Taiwan had a greater landing ship fleet. After 2000, mainland has a greater fleet. In 2021, the PLAN has 30 Type 072 II, Type 072A and Type 072B and other types of large landing ships and Taiwan navy only has 7. The mainland's advantage is absolute.

Dock landing ships.

The evolution of the trend is divided by the year 2007. Before 2007, the PLAN had no dock landing ships in service, and Taiwan navy had only a few ships. Since 2007, mainland's Type 071 LSDs have been entering service one after another and PLNA had a greater fleet in 2012. In 2021, the mainland navy has 8 LSDs and the advantage is absolute.

Amphibious assault ships (or helicopter landing docks).

---

In most of the times, neither the mainland nor Taiwan had this type of warship. The PLAN's first Type 075 amphibious assault ship was launched in April 2017 and entered service in April 2021. Thus the mainland's advantage is absolute.

Here comes the following question: is that enough? Chiang Kai-shek had to transport his troops crossing the strait to launch the counterattack and PLA also has to transport its divisions and brigades across the strait to unify Taiwan by force, have they had enough landing ships? **The answer was no for most of times. Neither the mainland nor Taiwan had had enough transports in the past.**

In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the Taiwan authorities had not stopped planning to "counterattack the mainland." But due to the severe shortage of naval transport capacity, Taiwan was unable to launch large-scale campaigns. In 1953, Taiwan formulated the "Kai An" project to counterattack the mainland, planning to transport an army corp at a time for amphibious landing. The Taiwan Navy's capacity was severely inadequate, and it needed an additional 357,500 tons of landing ship capacity. Take the Taiwan Navy's "Zhonghai-Class Tank Landing Ship" as an example. One of the Zhonghai LST had a capacity of about 3,500 tons<sup>86</sup>, and 100 ships had a capacity of 350,000 tons. This meant that the landing fleet had had to expand exponentially, which indicated that it had been extremely difficult to implement the "Kai An". The United States opposed the plan and refused to supplement the naval capacity of Taiwan, as a result, the "Kai An" was stranded.

In 1950, the new born PLAN formed its own landing ship fleet with 10 captured US LSTs. The mainland's naval transport capacity had been growing in the 1970s with home-made Type 072 landing ships entering service. During the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, PLNA had only 13 large landing ships, being not capable of transporting enough troops to Taiwan.

Taiwan has been keeping a close look at the mainland's transporting fleet. Before 2004, Taiwan's defense reports had claimed that PLA's naval transport was only enough for a reinforced division at a time. And Taiwan didn't believe that the mainland was capable of conducting landing operations to take over Taiwan in 2019.

The PLAN had 33 large landing ships and 6 Type 071 dock landing ships with a full load displacement over 270,000 tonnages in 2019. And in 2020, the

---

<sup>86</sup> [https://navy.mnd.gov.tw/AboutUs/Other\\_Info.aspx?ID=1&AID=30037](https://navy.mnd.gov.tw/AboutUs/Other_Info.aspx?ID=1&AID=30037)

---

mainland commissioned 2 more Type 071 LSDs with additional 40,000 tonnages. Taiwan believed that PLA would “complete the establishment of a formidable military arsenal for conducting military operations against Taiwan before 2020”. And a Type 075 amphibious assault ship entered service in 2021 with an additional 40,000 tonnages. This report believes that PLAN has enough amphibious delivery capability to conducting a successful landing battle in Taiwan in 2021.

Amphibious assault force would be transported ashore during a landing battle. Generally speaking, the Marine Corps and Army amphibious troops would be deployed for the task.

The evolution of the trend is divided by the year 2000. Taiwan had the upper hand before 2000. PLA built its first marine division in 1980 and its first army amphibious division in 1999 (Taiwanese army has no similar units). From then on, the mainland has more amphibious troops.

The PLA started the comprehensive restructuring in 2015 and amphibious divisions were transformed into brigades. According to US DOD’s China Military Power reports, PLA has built 6 army amphibious brigades and 8 marine brigades. The restructuring indicated that the mainland government has emphasized heavily on the construction of amphibious troops, which has been the key of the military preparation against Taiwan independence.

The 2020 DOD China Military Power Report stated that “the PLANMC (the marine corps of PLA) continues to work towards fully equipping its four newly established maneuver brigades” in 2019. In October 2020, mainland’s Xinhua News Agency reported that one of the newly established marine brigades has “initial operational capability”<sup>87</sup>. Mainland China’s lead Xi Jinping visited a marine brigade stationed in Guangdong, indicating the center’s close attention on the construction of amphibious assault capabilities<sup>88</sup>. Xi required the brigade to take more exercise, “stay highly alert” and build an “elite unite”.

**The report has found that the mainland’s amphibious assault force have the absolute advantage and at least have “initial operational capability” in 2021 and thus are able to be deployed in a landing battle in Taiwan.**

### 3) The Comparison of the Airforce between the Mainland and Taiwan

---

<sup>87</sup> [http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-10/05/c\\_1210829646.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-10/05/c_1210829646.htm)

<sup>88</sup> [http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-10/13/c\\_1126601561.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-10/13/c_1126601561.htm)

---

This report has 4 third-degree indicators: the size of the fourth generation fighter fleet, the size of the fifth generation fighter fleet, the size of medium and long range bomber fleet and the size of airborne troops.

The fourth and fifth generation fighters refer to the fourth and fifth generation jet fighters after the WW II according to the standards proposed by the U.S. Air Force. The representatives of the fourth-generation fighters on both sides of the Taiwan Strait include the J-10s, J-11s, and J-16s from the mainland, and the Mirage-2000s and F-16s from Taiwan. These are the main battle types of both air forces. The only type of active fifth-generation fighters on both sides of the strait are the J-20 fighters from the mainland.

The fourth-generation fighters entered service of both air forces in the 1990s. Before that, the mainland and Taiwan had had great amount of older generations of fighters, such as J-5s, J-6s, J-7s of the mainland and F-104s, F-5s, IDFs of Taiwan. Those antique fighters have one problem in common, that is their short operational radius reducing their capabilities to operate across the Taiwan Strait. Therefore this report will not discuss old fighters.

The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) started to commission fourth-generation fighters in 1992 when SU-27s made in Russia entered service. From 1992 to 1996, the PLAAF had had the upper hand. But due to the limited size of Su-27 fleet, the mainland's advantage was limited.

Since 1996, Taiwan air force started to commission French Dassault Mirage 2000s and American F-16 Fighting Falcons. Its four-generation fighter fleet exceeded the mainland's rapidly and Taiwan air force kept exceeding until 2004. Taiwan itself does not have developed fighter industry, so it could not research and manufacture advanced fighters. Moreover, because the mainland's opposition, Western countries have long been hesitant to irritate China and refused to sell more advanced fighters to Taiwan. Therefore Taiwan could not replenish the fourth-generation fighter fleet for a long time and the amount of fighters has even been decreased because of accidents.

In 2019, the Donald Trump administration ignored the mainland's opposition and ratified to sell 66 F-16Vs to Taiwan, which deteriorated US-China relation and tensed the Cross-Strait relations. But this batch of aircrafts will be

---

delivered as early as 2024<sup>89</sup>, so Taiwan air force dose not scale up in 2021.

In 2000s, the mainland commissioned self-developed J-10s, and successively commissioned J-11s (the domestic version of Su-27) and J-16s (the domestic version of Su-30). The size of fourth-generation fighter fleet had been growing and surpassed Taiwan in 2004. According to the US China Military Power reports, the PLAAF had 800 fourth-generation fighters in 2019. This was four times the size of Taiwan's and took the absolute lead.

In 2016, the mainland's self-developed fifth-generation fighter J-20s entered service. *The Diplomat* estimated in January 2021 that the PLA Air Force already had 40 J-20s<sup>90</sup> and had absolute superiority.

The evolution of medium- and long-range bomber fleet was divided into two stages by the year 1960. In the first stage, Taiwan was leading while in the second stage, it was the other way around.

Before 1960, Taiwan air force had around 220 B-24 and B-25 bombers manufactured in the US, while the mainland only had 10 T-4 bombers purchased from Soviet Union. Taiwan had been able to launch air strikes to mainland's cities with those bombers. In 1960, all the medium and long-range bombers of the Taiwan air force were decommissioned, and no new aircrafts have entered service after that.

In 1969, the mainland commissioned H-6 bombers and has manufactured 230 aircrafts gradually. Today, H-6 is already modernized and derives to numerous types. In 2011, H-6K entered service, which was able to launch precision strike weapons and CJ-10 cruise missiles, capable of standoff attack. H-6 bombers had long range and conducted several "round-Taiwan-island" patrols since 2015. On one hand, these military drills could inspect the bomber force's combat capability to attack from the east of Taiwan Island. On the other hand, "round-Taiwan-island" patrols showed the mainland's attitude in response to DPP government's "Taiwan independence" policy and have been the implications of the deteriorating Cross-Strait relations.

Airborne troops are essential in the Cross-Strait conflict because they are able to be deployed quickly. Concerning the formation of airborne troops, Taiwan

---

<sup>89</sup> <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3815244>

<sup>90</sup> <https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/j-20-the-stealth-fighter-that-changed-pla-watching-forever/>

---

had an advantage over the mainland before 1960. From 1960 to 1999, Taiwan had 2 airborne divisions (or brigades), and the size had been similar to that of the mainland.

In 1999, Taiwan cancelled the airborne brigades and changed them to air cavalry units mobilizing with helicopters. The mainland started to take the lead. After the military reform in 2015, the mainland changed airborne divisions to airborne brigades and scaled up the size. Until 2021, PLA has 7 airborne brigades with increasing combat capabilities. And the mainland has attached great importance to airborne troops development.

#### 4) Comparison of Standoff Weapons

The standoff weapons are significant in the Cross-Strait military conflicts because they could be used to attack important targets such as sea ports, airports, and military bases. For the mainland, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles are the key components of its A2/AD system. They could be used to deter foreign enemies and prevent the foreign powers from interfering the Cross-Strait situations.

The report selects two third-level indicators: the number of short and medium-range ballistic missiles and the number of cruise missiles.

Since 1960s, a series of types of short and medium-range ballistic missiles including DF-2, DF-3, DF-15 entered service, leading to the advantage of the mainland. However, according to public reports, the mainland's missile technology at that time was not advanced and not so many of them had been deployed. Therefore the mainland's advantage was limited.

According to the China Military Power reports issued by the US Department of Defense, since 2000, due to the substantial increase in military expenditures and the advancement of missile technology, the mainland began to manufacture and deploy missiles on a large scale. By 2021, the mainland has about 850 missiles of different types, such as DF-15, DF-16, DF-21D, DF-26, and DF-17 which carries hypersonic glide vehicles.

Taiwan's ballistic missile research and development program started late and was in small scale. American think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies revealed that Taiwan only has a small number of "Sky Spear" missiles

---

in service. Therefore, the mainland has an absolute advantage.

The mainland started to commission CJ-10 cruise missiles since 2007. In 2021, it possesses 300 missiles of CJ-10, CJ-20, and CJ-100. Taiwan commissioned a small number of ground-attacking cruise missiles, such as Hsiung Feng IIEs and Wan Chien. The mainland is absolutely leading in this part.

Despite the limited number of standoff weapons, Taiwan is noticeably confident. As Taiwan media *United Daily News* reported in September 2020, Tsai Ing-wen went to Peng-hu Islands to inspect the Taiwan troops, and the Wan Chien missiles are deployed with the Taiwan air force stationed there. *United Daily News* stated that Taiwan air force taking off from Peng-hu Islands with Wan Chien missiles were capable of striking targets deep into the mainland, capable of attacking the mainland's airports, radar stations, military bases, etc.<sup>91</sup> This manifested Taiwan military's strategic conception of "credible deterrence" and "multi-domain deterrence".

#### 5) Comparison of Armies of the Mainland and Taiwan

The equipment system of ground forces is complex. This report only selects one third-level indicator: the number of third-generation main battle tanks.

The third-generation main battle tanks have entered service in the 1980s. They weigh more than 50 tons and are equipped with composite armors and digital fire control systems. Their combat capability has been greatly improved compared with previous tanks. Internationally famous models include the American M1 "Abrams".

In 1999 National Day military parade, the mainland Type 99 MBTs were unveiled. According to the China Military Power report issued by the US Department of Defense, Type 99 MBTs officially entered service in 2007. It is the only third-generation main battle tank of the mainland and Taiwan by now. The mainland has never disclosed how many of Type 99 MBTs it has officially, and the media's estimations vary from hundreds to thousands. The report speculates that by 2021, there are 1,000 of vehicles of Type 99 and its derivative models.

Taiwan does not have any third-generation main battle tanks by now. In 2019.

---

<sup>91</sup> <https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4879651>

---

Trump administration ratified to sell 108 M1A2T “Abrams” to Taiwan. The trade of third-generation main battle equipment deteriorated China-US relation and Cross-Strait relations. The tanks are expected to be delivered in 2022<sup>92</sup>. Before that, the PLA’s third-generation tanks still take the lead.

#### 6) Comparison of Reconnaissance Systems of the Mainland and Taiwan

The report selects one third-level indicator: the size of the air force’s early warning aircraft fleet.

Early warning aircrafts are the platform of airborne command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Early warning aircrafts are able to scan 100 to 1,000 kilometers region at 10,000 meters altitude with attached radars, detecting intelligence of a large area. It also serves as the center of command and control of the battlespace in an air engagement, which is key in air combats (and marine battles).

Both parties of the Strait had not had early warning aircrafts for a long time. **It implied that the air forces’ combat capabilities of the mainland and Taiwan had been quite limited for a long time.** Without the early warning aircrafts, the advanced fourth- and fifth-generation fighters could not fully function, and both air forces could not organize large-scale air battles.

In 1996, Taiwan purchased 4 American E-2 Hawkeye early warning aircrafts, and has been keeping a small size of early warning aircraft fleet till now. In 1970s, the mainland developed early warning aircrafts (namely “KJ-1”) based on TU-4 bombers, but the project eventually failed. According to the China Military Power reports issued by the US Department of Defense, since the end of 1990s, the PLA air force started to commission a large number of early warning aircrafts, including models like KJ-200 and KJ-500, and has been kept a fleet with a size of 100 aircrafts. The mainland has the absolute advantage in this part.

For the mainland, early warning aircraft fleet is a crucial part of A2/AD. According to the China Military Power reports issued by the US Department of Defense, since the end of 1990s, the mainland started to use satellites, early warning aircrafts, and ground radar stations to build real-time reconnaissance

---

<sup>92</sup> <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3783933>

---

capability against Taiwan Island and in the west of the second island chain. Taiwan 2019 National Defense Report stated that “the PRC is now capable of monitoring dynamic air and maritime status on the western side of the second island chain”, which meant the mainland finished building the early warning system.

The mainland has deployed DF-21D missiles, which are able to attack warships of foreign countries. But modern warships are able to run as fast as 30 knots at sea. They are highly mobile and are able to cover a distance as several times of their own length in a minute. The mainland’s Rocket Force can barely hit the moving targets on the sea if it cannot monitor dynamic air and maritime status in real time. The report deems that since 2019, the mainland started to have practical deterrence on the western side of the second island chain.

#### **4.6 The Conclusion**

Taiwan defense strategy has 6 stages from 1950 to the present, namely “offensive operations”, “offensive and defensive operations as one”, “defensive operations”, “effective deterrence and resolute defense”, “resolute defense and effective deterrence”, and “resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence”. Taiwan’s defense policy in the first stage was a manifestation of its political guideline “counterattack against the mainland”. From 1950s to 1970s, Taiwan had advantage in air naval and air force. It constantly launched military attacks to the mainland and the Cross-Strait frictions happened frequently. Then, Taiwan stopped attacks and chose the defensive strategy. With the development of mainland’s military forces, the military strengths between two parties tended to be balanced and there were no military frictions. This implied the risk decrease of the Cross-Strait relations. However, Taiwan defense strategy has not given up resisting reunification by force, which was claimed the strategy of “resolute defense” and “effective deterrence”. Since 1990s, Taiwan air force and navy purchased a large amount of advanced equipment. The mainland’s national defense policy had to reiterate the opposition to separatists advocating “Taiwan independence” and speed up the national defense construction and military preparations. Nowadays, the mainland’s military forces have overwhelmed Taiwan and the PLA air force and navy have conducted round-Taiwan-island patrols for several times. This indicates a high the Cross-Strait relations risk now.

---

## 5. Economic Relations

For the study of cross-strait economic relations, this report adopted 2 second-level indicators as trade and investment and 5 third-level indicators including cross-strait trade volume, the proportion of the trade volume in the mainland's total foreign trade volume, the proportion of the trade volume in Taiwan's total foreign trade volume, trade surplus and deficits, and investments.

Trade value and investments directly reflect the activity of economic and trade exchanges across the strait. The proportion cross-strait trade volume accounting for in each other's total foreign trade indicates the importance of it for the two sides. Trade balance shows the two sides' dependency on cross-strait trading.

This report finds more trade exchanges and rising importance of cross-strait trade for the two sides will reduce the cross-strait risk, otherwise the opposite. If the cross-strait trade remains balanced with a narrow gap, the risk will be low. Wide trade gap is a source of friction.

Data for the 4 trade-concerned third-level indicators can be checked in Appendix 2, sourced from official agencies including Ministry of Commerce of the PRC<sup>93</sup>, Central Administration of Customs of the PRC<sup>94</sup>, "Ministry of Finance" of Taiwan<sup>95</sup> and "Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs"<sup>96</sup>.

### 5.1 Cross-strait Trade

Trading between the mainland and Taiwan can be divided into two distinctive phases with the mainland's Reform and Open-up policy as the line. There is no trade exchange in the first phase. In the second phase, the two sides opened trade to each other, with the trade volume growing yearly.


---

<sup>93</sup> <http://tga.mofcom.gov.cn/article/sjzl/taiwan/>

<sup>94</sup> <http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/zfxgk/2799825/302274/302275/9f806879-1.html>

<sup>95</sup> <http://web02.mof.gov.tw/njswww/WebMain.aspx?sys=100&funid=defjsptgl>

<sup>96</sup> [https://www.moeaic.gov.tw/business\\_category.view?lang=ch&seq=1](https://www.moeaic.gov.tw/business_category.view?lang=ch&seq=1)




(Graph 2: Cross-strait trade in goods in Millions of USD, 1979-2020)

As shown in Graph 2, the cross-strait trade value after 1979 experienced two stages with the year 1999 as the dividing line. Trade volume grows slowly in the first stage. In the stage after, exponential growth is achieved, illustrated with a steep curve. Though there're ups and downs, the figure is rising in general.

According to the Central Administration of Customs of the PRC, cross-strait trade in 2020 achieves a record high of 260.8 billion USD, a 14.3% year-on-year growth. The mainland's exports to Taiwan reaches USD 60.1 billion and the imports USD 200.7 billion, a year-on-year increase of 9.1% and 16% respectively, both an all-time high.

This report finds higher Trade volume reduces the cross-strait risk greatly while a lower one will reduce it mildly.

Cross-strait trade proportion refers to the respective proportion of cross-strait trade volume in the total foreign trade volume of the two sides, which reflects the weight of cross-strait trade in each side's foreign trade.




(Graph 3: cross-strait trade as a percentage of total foreign trade of the two sides of the strait, 1978-2020)

In Graph 3, blue curve represents the cross-strait trade as a percentage of total mainland foreign trade and the red curve that of Taiwan. Trend of the two curves is divided by the year 1993 into two phases. In the first phase, proportion of the cross-strait trade for the two sides is almost the same and keeps rising. In the second phase, the two curves have taken remarkable different ways. The blue curve reaches its peak in 1993, after which it stops growing, starts declining from 2008 and then stays at around 5%. In contrast, the red curve continues growing, constantly making new highs.

This shows the importance of cross-strait trade is different for the two sides and its trend along each other's foreign trade development is different too. The proportion for the mainland remains for a long time at around 5% so its importance is limited. For Taiwan, the proportion keeps growing and reaches even 41.33% in 2020. In general, the mainland is not dependent on cross-strait trade while Taiwan becomes increasingly dependent on it.


The report finds the higher the proportion is, the lower the risk will be. Judging from the current condition, the proportion for the mainland relieves the risk in a limited degree while that for Taiwan plays a more effective role in relieving the risk.



(Graph 4: Cross-strait trade balance in Million USD, 1979-2020)

In Graph 4, except a temporary surplus in 1979, the mainland has been seeing continuous rising deficits in cross-strait trade, which reaches USD 140.523 billion in 2020. This is the data support for media's description that "the mainland is returning a favor to Taiwan", and also an evidence of Taiwan's increasing dependency on the mainland. Deficit has always been a source of trade frictions. In this report, cross-strait risk lifts with a rising trade deficit.


## 5.2 Cross-strait Investment



(Graph 5: Taiwan capital actually utilized by the mainland in Million USD)

In Graph 5, the trend of Taiwan capital actually utilized by the mainland is divided by the year 2002 into two stages. In the first stage, the number is

growing yearly. In the second stage, the trend begins going down. In 2020, the Taiwan capital actually utilized by the mainland is around USD 1 billion, back to the level of 1992.



(Graph 6: Cross-strait investments)

In Graph 6, the mainland's investment to Taiwan is also included. Mainland investment to Taiwan is in small amount, only a fraction of Taiwan's investment to the mainland. What's more, mainland investment to Taiwan has been reduced since 2012 to only USD 97 million.

In general, cross-strait investment experiences a stage of rapid growth at the beginning. Since 2003, especially after 2012, it takes on a trend of recession and has been shrinking year after year. Cross-strait investment is not in large scale, which indicates the two sides' opening to each other or private investors' wishes are limited. This report finds investments contribute to lower risk more investments would lower the risk further.

### 5.3 The Conclusion

With the mainland's implementation of Reform and Open-up policy, the two sides began to open trade to each other. From 1979 to the present, cross-strait trade value has been constantly growing and reaches an all-time high of USD 260.8 billion. Cross-strait investment grew rapidly in the 1990s and began to decrease after reaching a peak at 2000. The degree of opening across the strait is relatively high in terms of trading, yet limited in regards of investment. The proportion cross-strait trade accounts for in the mainland's total foreign trade volume keeps at around 5%. Yet the proportion for Taiwan has been

---

continuously growing and achieves 41.33% at 2020, which means Taiwan is highly dependent on cross-strait trade. For most years after the two sides open trade to each other, the mainland has been facing trade deficits. Since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the deficit has consistently enlarged to USD 140.523 billion in 2020. In general, frequency of cross-trade economic and trading activities increases, indicating a lower risk in cross-strait relations. Yet the over large trade deficit is at the same time raising the risk.

---

## 6. Social Exchanges and Public Opinions

Studying the social exchanges and public opinions across the strait that would change the risk, this section analyzes the social and private exchanges between the mainland and Taiwan, and the understanding on some major political subjects of people across the strait. The social factor includes two second-level indicators as civil travels and public opinions across the strait, and five third-level indicators including number of the mainland residents visiting Taiwan, number of the Taiwan residents visiting the mainland, number of people married across the strait, popularity of “reunification by force” among the mainland residents and Taiwan residents’ recognition of the identity as “Taiwanese”.

The first three indicators reflect the activity of social exchanges between the mainland and Taiwan. Higher activity represents lower risk. The last two shows the public opinions and understanding on Taiwan Question, which has a great influence on cross-strait risk.

Data for the third-level indicators in this part are sourced from “Tourism Bureau, MOTC”<sup>97</sup> and “Department of Statistics, MOI” of Taiwan<sup>98</sup>. For the mainland residents’ opinions on “reunification by force”, the report adopts the searching results of key word “武统 台湾” on Google Trends<sup>99</sup>. For the problem of Taiwan residents’ self-identification, this report refers to the latest research report released in January 2021 by Election Study Center, National Chengchi University<sup>100</sup>. Detailed data for the five indicators can be checked in Appendix 3.

### 6.1 Civil Travels Across the Strait

Transportation department of Taiwan counted the number of people visiting across the strait since 2008.


---

<sup>97</sup> <https://stat.taiwan.net.tw/inboundSearch>

<sup>98</sup> <https://statis.moi.gov.tw/micst/stmain.jsp?sys=100>

<sup>99</sup> <https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=US&q=%E6%AD%A6%E7%BB%9F%20%E5%8F%B0%E6%B9%BE>


<sup>100</sup> <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7804&id=6960>



(Graph 7: Number of visits between people across the strait, 2008-2020)

In Graph 7, the blue curve represents the number of the mainland residents visiting Taiwan and the other represents the number of Taiwan residents visiting the mainland. The trend of the mainland residents' visits to Taiwan is divided into two phases by the year 2015. The trend of Taiwan residents' visit to the mainland is divided into two phases by the year 2017. In the first stage, cross-strait visits surge rapidly from hundreds of thousands to millions. In the second stage, the number plunges to the level of that of the very beginning. The data have experienced large fluctuations. By 2020, the number of the mainland residents visiting Taiwan reaches an all-time low of 111,050. The number of Taiwan residents visiting the mainland for the same year is 414,634, the lowest since 2009. The lowest point in 2020 is both an extension of the trend of years before and a result of the pandemic.

In this report, the number of people visiting across the strait reflects the degree of opening and friendliness between the two sides. With friendly relations, generous policies between the two sides and leaders' support of exchanges, number of cross-strait visits will increase, otherwise the opposite. It can also indicate the people's views on the other side. If people's views on the other side are positive, there will be more visits across the strait, otherwise the opposite. Cross-strait risk reduces with a rising number of cross-strait visits.




(Graph 8: Number of people married across the strait, 2001-2020)

As shown in Graph 8, the number of people married across the strait reaches a peak in 2003. In the same year, the administration of Chen Shui-bian settled an “Interview Mechanism for mainland Spouses”.

After a short period of increase, the number of people married across the strait begins to reduce since 2003. In 2020 the number hits a record low of 2363, totally 3203 if those for Hong Kong and Macau included, 61.5% down from 2019. Same as the cross-strait visits, this indicator in essence shows the degree of exchanges between people across the strait. This report finds an increased number of people married across the strait will reduce the risk. When the number shrinks, its role in easing the risk is limited.

## 6.2 Public Opinions Across the Strait


In the mainland, “reunification by force” (i.e., the “武统台湾” in Chinese) is a sensitive topic. No institute has conducted any surveys or polling people’s opinion on that topic and keeps a track of the results to show the changes in public opinions. Therefore, this report makes use of Google Trends. This report searched key word “武统 台湾” and limited the search to the mainland’s networks to get changes in the popularity of the key word, which can be used to describe the changes in mainland people’s opinions on this topic.



(Graph 9: “武统 台湾” on Google Trends)

As Shown in Graph 9, the heat of “武统 台湾” experiences two distinctive stages with the year 2016 as the dividing line. In the first stage, the key word has almost no heat and is rarely mentioned. **Since 2016, heat of this key word takes on exponential growth, constantly making new highs.**

It's notable that the dividing pointing is just the year when the government of Tsai Ing-wen from DPP came to power. After taking the office, Tsai promoted the policy of “Taiwan Independence” and denied the “1992 Consensus”, causing tensions between the mainland and Taiwan. As a result, the mainland people mention “reunification by force” more and more frequently. This indicates changes in the public opinions among the mainlanders. This report finds that lower popularity of “武统 台湾” indicates a lowering of the cross-strait risk, while greater popularity indicates an increasing of the risk.



(Graph 10: Change trend of Taiwan residents' self-identification in percent)

Graph 10 is sourced from the Election Study Center, NCCU<sup>101</sup>. The green curve represents the percentage of Taiwan residents' self-identification as "Taiwanese"; the blue one represents their self-identification as "Chinese"; the purple one represents their self-identification as "both Taiwanese and Chinese".

The graph shows that the percentage of Taiwan residents' self-identification as "Chinese" or "both Taiwanese and Chinese" is declining year by year in general, while their self-identification as "Taiwanese" is rising.

In 1992, Taiwan residents' self-identification as "both Taiwanese and Chinese" gains the greatest percentage, followed by "Chinese" and "Taiwanese" in order. In the years after, their self-identification as "Taiwanese" grows rapidly, surpassing that as "Chinese" and "both Taiwanese and Chinese" in 1995 and 2005 respectively. **By 2020, as many as 64.3% Taiwan residents identify themselves as only "Taiwanese", reaching a new high in history. 29.9% and only 2.6% Taiwan residents take themselves as "both Taiwanese and Chinese" and "Chinese" respectively, both hitting a new low.**

<sup>101</sup> <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6960/People202012.jpg>

---

When people in Taiwan generally agreed on “Chinese” and “both Taiwanese and Chinese”, the authorities must respond to the public opinions to implement mainland-friendly policies. Friendly public opinions on the mainland would also lead to more social exchanges. Instead, when people commonly accept the identity of “Taiwanese”, the authorities will adopt “Taiwan Independence” policies willfully. The report finds that higher recognition for “Chinese” and “both Taiwanese and Chinese” leads to lower risk, while the more they agree on the identity as “Taiwanese”, the higher the risk.

### **6.3 The Conclusion**

Cross-strait civil visits are presented in a “bell curve”, first up and then down, and hit a new low in 2020. Number of people married across the strait is small and takes on a trend of declining. Fewer civil exchanges indicate increased risk in cross-strait relations.

Nowadays, public opinions among people across the strait are both “unfriendly”. In the mainland, more discussions about “reunification by force” have appeared since Tai Ing-wen took the office. In Taiwan, people’s self-identification as “Chinese” touches a new low in single digits. Self-identification as “Taiwanese” reaches a new high of over 60%. This is an embodiment of tensions between the two sides.

---

## 7. Foreign Countries' Policies and Positions on Taiwan

This part is about other countries' policies and positions regarding Taiwan. The United States is at the top of countries related to Taiwan problem and able to exert major influences on Taiwan Strait situation, followed by Japan and Australia, its allies in Asia-Pacific. For this part, four third-level indicators are adopted: US arms sales to Taiwan over the years, US Navy's activities in Taiwan Strait, Japan's policies and positions on Taiwan, and Australia's policies and positions on Taiwan. The first two can reflect the US' attitude towards Taiwan, while the last two represent that of Japan and Australia. **Historically speaking, the major external cause of the Taiwan problem has been the US' interference in China's internal affairs and its long-time bias for Taiwan.** The times of US arms sales to Taiwan and its Navy vessels' crossing the Taiwan Strait can reflect the degree of US interference in Taiwan.

### 7.1 The United States


#### 1) US Arms Sales to Taiwan Over the Years

Regarding Taiwan as a critical part of its interests in Asia-Pacific, the US interfered in China's internal affairs by flagrantly involving itself in the Taiwan Strait situation as early as 1950. Its interferences vary in forms. In the 1950s and 1960s, the US delivered a great amount of arms to Taiwan in the name of "aid", despite the objection of the mainland. This led to the unsettlement of the Taiwan problem and the continuing deterioration of the Taiwan Strait situation. In 1979, the US formally established diplomatic relations with China, after which it didn't give up Taiwan and continued to arm the Taiwan authorities through arms sales. Graph 10 is the data of US' arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, sourced from Congressional Research Service's report on US arms sales to Taiwan<sup>102</sup> and the website Federal Register<sup>103</sup>.

---

<sup>102</sup> <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf>

<sup>103</sup> <https://www.federalregister.gov>



(Graph 11: US arms sales to Taiwan in millions of USD, 1979-2020)

In the graph, three peaks appear during the period from 1979 to 2020. The first peak occurs between 1992 and 1993, during the administration of Clinton. At that time, the US sold to Taiwan 150 F-16 fighters (the delivery began in 1996 and they were deployed in 1997) and other advanced arms including several hundred sets of SM-I and PAC air defense systems.

The second peak appears in 2001 when the administration of George W. Bush approved selling 4 Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan (delivered and put into service in 2005). The third peak is during Trump's administration selling 66 F-16V fighters and 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks (not delivered yet).

In this report, US government's arms sales to Taiwan have two effects on the cross-strait risk: military power effect, having impact on the two sides' military power, and political effect. US arms sales is the top external cause of the deterioration of cross-strait relations and the rise in cross-strait tensions. **Politically, US arms sales to Taiwan would only stir up conflicts between the mainland and Taiwan and escalate the cross-strait risk.** Since the military power effect has been discussed in the military power comparison part, this part discusses only the political effect.

## 2) US Navy's Activities in Taiwan Strait

In 1950, the US interfered in China's internal affairs by sending Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, after which the US naval forces were stationed into Taiwan. In 1955, the US established United States Taiwan Defense Command

functioning under United States Pacific Command. At that time US Navy's activities in the Taiwan Strait are a regular operation of it. In 1979, the US broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan and withdrew its troops. In 1996, the US sent two carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait. Later, since China-US relations were improved, the US Navy ceased their operations in the area for a while. In 2017, China-US relations deteriorated after Donald Trump took office, and US military vessels reappeared in the Taiwan Strait. Times that US vessels cross the strait each year is listed in Table 3.

year	times
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	3
2019	9
2020	13
2021	4

(Table 5: the time of year and the times that US vessels sail through the Taiwan Strait, 2015-2021)

The report finds US vessels sailing through the strait a mark of the deterioration of China-US relations. The frequency of that reflects the degree of the deterioration. These actions of the US can also lead to tensions in Taiwan Strait situation. The more the US vessels sail through the strait, the higher risk there would be.

## 7.2 Japan and Australia

### 1) Japan

Japan is an important partner of the US in Asia and has a close tie with Taiwan.

In 1952, Taiwan authorities signed the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan<sup>104</sup>. According to the treaty, Japan formally ended the state of wars with "the Republic of China". It recognized "the Republic of China" and denied the People's Republic of China in the mainland.

In 1969, the US-Japan Joint Statement<sup>105</sup> was declared. In the statement, the US said it would protect Taiwan, and Japan said the peace and security in

<sup>104</sup>

[https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News\\_Content.aspx?n=53CFB45A329E6B01&sms=8BFD8EF69DF69F75&s=6AF7BADE42537535](https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=53CFB45A329E6B01&sms=8BFD8EF69DF69F75&s=6AF7BADE42537535)

<sup>105</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-56785182>

---

Taiwan area was in the interest of itself.

In 1971, in the UN's discussed the restoration of the PRC's legal seat, Japan cast a no vote.

In 1972, China and Japan formally established diplomatic relations<sup>106</sup>. Japan recognized the PRC and the principle of "One China", and unilaterally terminated the Treaty signed with Taiwan in 1952.

During the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, Japan's House of Councilors Committee on Foreign Affairs released a statement<sup>107</sup>, expressing the hope for a "peaceful settlement" of the Taiwan problem. Yet at the same time, it extended "welcome" of the development of Taiwan's democratic framework.

In 1998, Japan amended its domestic laws to recognize passports issued by "Republic of China"<sup>108</sup> and resumed the 72-hour Transit Visa Exemption to Taiwan.

In 2002<sup>109</sup> and 2004, Japan expressed support for Taiwan's entering the WHO as observer. Department of foreign affairs of the Taiwan authorities appreciated it<sup>110</sup>.

In 2005, Japan publicly objected China's issuing of the Anti-Secession Law<sup>111</sup>.

In 2011, Japan and Taiwan signed "Investment Agreement" and "Open Skies Agreement"<sup>112</sup>.

In 2013, Taiwan and Japan signed Fishery Agreement<sup>113</sup>.

In 2017, the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan released China Security Report 2017-the Changing China-Taiwan

---

<sup>106</sup> [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao\\_674904/wjs\\_6](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/wjs_6)

<sup>107</sup> <https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPCH/19960516.O1J.html>

<sup>108</sup>

[https://www.mac.gov.tw/News\\_Content.aspx?n=3D7C9BFC4F86BF4A&sms=CDA642B408087E65&s=7C5738BA69E3BA3B#031](https://www.mac.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=3D7C9BFC4F86BF4A&sms=CDA642B408087E65&s=7C5738BA69E3BA3B#031)

<sup>109</sup>

[https://www.mac.gov.tw/News\\_Content.aspx?n=3D7C9BFC4F86BF4A&sms=CDA642B408087E65&s=16AC004377136463](https://www.mac.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=3D7C9BFC4F86BF4A&sms=CDA642B408087E65&s=16AC004377136463)

<sup>110</sup>

[https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News\\_Content.aspx?n=faeee2f9798a98fd&sms=6dc19d8f09484c89&s=e735d5b5a20e0c3f](https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=faeee2f9798a98fd&sms=6dc19d8f09484c89&s=e735d5b5a20e0c3f)

<sup>111</sup>

[https://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web\\_UTF-8/almanac/almanac2005/WebPages/MICO/08/08\\_01\\_01.htm](https://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac/almanac2005/WebPages/MICO/08/08_01_01.htm)

<sup>112</sup> <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taiwan/pdfs/kankei.pdf>

<sup>113</sup> <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taiwan/pdfs/kankei.pdf>

Relations. In the report, Japan referred to Taiwan as “People’s Republic of China” and cited the relationship between China’s mainland and Taiwan as that of “two political entities”, which resulted in China’s protest<sup>114</sup>.

In 2019, Taro Kono, Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed support for Taiwan’s joining in the WHO as observer<sup>115</sup>.

**In 2020, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed support for Taiwan’s joining in the WHO<sup>116</sup>.**

In Feb. 2021, Japanese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Taro Aso appreciated Taiwan’s performance in fighting against the pandemic and referred to Taiwan as “Republic of China”<sup>117</sup>.

## 2) Australia’s Policies and Positions on Taiwan

In 1955, Australia voted against the restoration of the PRC’s lawful seat in the UN<sup>118</sup>.

In 1971, Australia again voted against the restoration of the PRC’s lawful seat in the UN.

In 1972, Australia established diplomatic relations with China, recognized the “One China Principle” and broke off diplomatic ties with Taiwan<sup>119</sup>.

In 2017, Australia published Foreign Policy White Paper, and was concerned about China’s “use of force or coercion” in the Taiwan Strait<sup>120</sup>.

In 2018, the media exposed the so called “secret treaty between Taiwan and Australia”, indicating that Australia transferred Nauru patients in critical condition to Taiwan for treatment<sup>121</sup>.

<sup>114</sup>

[https://web.archive.org/web/20180330212619/https://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/WebArchive/2044/106%E5%B9%B41%E8%87%B312%E6%9C%88\\_%E4%B8%AD%E6%96%87.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20180330212619/https://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/WebArchive/2044/106%E5%B9%B41%E8%87%B312%E6%9C%88_%E4%B8%AD%E6%96%87.pdf)

<sup>115</sup> <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2783429>

<sup>116</sup> [https://www.upmedia.mg/news\\_info.php?SerialNo=80308](https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=80308)

<sup>117</sup> <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202101300040.aspx>

<sup>118</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20181109070853/http://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/47/b5/d9.html>

<sup>119</sup>

[https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq\\_676201/gj\\_676203/dyz\\_681240/1206\\_681242/1207\\_681254/t4906.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/dyz_681240/1206_681242/1207_681254/t4906.shtml)

<sup>120</sup>

<https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper/fpwhitepaper/pdf/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf>

<sup>121</sup> <https://tw.appledaily.com/headline/20180625/F7ROWUZJONNXANF6ZOLGBUZZU/>

---

**In 2020, Australia congratulated Tsai Ing-wen on her re-election<sup>122</sup>.**

Australian government is in favor of Taiwan's joining in the WHO. The media said Australia was in a dilemma because it wanted to support Taiwan without offending China<sup>123</sup>. Japan and Australia are both the allies of the US in Asia-Pacific area and have close ties with Taiwan. Both of the two countries officially admit the "One China Principle", while governments and politicians of the two are actively giving their voices on Taiwan and supporting positions of Taiwan. Such situation has been getting worse in recent years, which leads to constant frictions between the mainland and the two countries and a rising risk in cross-strait relations.

**7.3 The Conclusion**

The US is the primary external cause of Taiwan problem. US military presentation in Taiwan and arms sales to Taiwan has been enabling Taiwan in resisting the reunification. Since 2017 when Donald Trump came to power, US government again approved large-scale arms sales to Taiwan, which severely interfered in China's internal affairs, caused tensions in cross-strait relations and raised the risk.

US patrols in the Taiwan Strait reflect the US government's attitude to Taiwan. Since Trump's administration, US Navy resumed the activity of sailing through the strait with an increasing frequency, and Joe Biden's administration has gone down the road.

Since the beginning of this year, Japan and Australia expressed frequent stands in favor of Taiwan. Emboldened by the support from its "allies", Taiwan constantly crossed the bottom line, which led to frictions with the mainland. The US, Japan and Australia's support for Taiwan has worsened the cross-strait relations and raised the risk.

---


<sup>122</sup> <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3039004>

<sup>123</sup>

<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-01/australia-still-backs-taiwan-return-who-risky-move/12204850>

## 8. Indicators Coding Result

The report has completed analysis of all third-level indicators, as shown in Appendix 4.



(Graph 12: Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index, 1950-2021)


Based on the analysis of the 38 third-level indicators and the curve pattern in Graph 11, this report concludes that the cross-strait risk is in a rising tendency. The Index for 2021 reaches a new high in history, which is consistent with the actual “situation of tensions” observed.

The trending of the Index between 1950 and 2021 falls into three phases.

In the first phase from 1950 to 1977, the Index remains high and stays steady.

In the second phase from 1978 to 2015, the Index first declines and then climbs.

In the third phase from 2016 to today, the Index continues rising to new highs.



(Graph 13: Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index with major events, 1950-2021)

The first phase corresponds to the period when Taiwan was under the control of Chiang Kai-shek and the mainland was still not open. During that period, Taiwan authorities threatened to launch “counterattack against the mainland” and constantly created armed frictions with the mainland. The two sides were involved in frequent “battles” against each other, making a stable high Index. The first high point on the curve appears between 1954 and 1955 during which armed conflicts including the Quemoy Bombardments, the Battle of Yijiangshan Islands and the Battle of Dachen Archipelago took place.

In the second phase, Taiwan surrendered its plan of “Counterattack and Restoration”. Cross-strait relations improved and exchanges increased. The mainland stuck to “One Country, Two Systems and Peaceful Reunification” and started the “Reform and Open-up”. Yet there were still risky moments. The risk increased along with a series of events and proposals undermining the cross-strait relations including Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US, the Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, “Two States theory”, and “One Country on Each Side” by Chen Shui-bian. The risk reduced after Ma Ying-jeou came to power and made efforts to ease the tensions, hitting the local low in 2015 when the meeting between leaders of the two sides was held.

In the third phase, following Tsai Ing-wen’s election in 2016, Taiwan has gone further down the road of “Taiwan Independence”. The Index turns around to rise, reaching the level in the first phase with a record new high.

This indicates the cross-strait risk has been pushed to a high level indicating conflicts, a conclusion consistent with the actual stressful situation.

---

## 9. The Conclusion

In this report, the Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index is compiled through analyzing indicators of three levels. 5 first-level indicators, 16 second-level indicators and 38 third-level indicators are included. By coding each third-level indicator, the report finally works out the general Index.

In the process of index building, the report finds that the relations risk is generally presenting a rising tendency and sees large increase in recent years with continuous new highs. A rising Index is in line with the increasingly stressful relations between the two sides.

Political factors are the fundamental source of tensions in cross-strait relations. Since the 1950s, Taiwan authorities' positions experience changes from "Counterattack and Restoration" to promoting reconciliation and to "Taiwan Independence". The mainland has always adhered to the policy of "Peaceful Reunification and One Country, Two Systems" and is given no choice but to frequently reiterate its objection against "Taiwan Independence" and position of reunification.

Since Tsai Ing-wen's inauguration, Taiwan has gone further on the road of "Taiwan Independence", forcing the mainland to respond in increasingly assertive posture. **This is the essential cause of the steady raise of cross-strait risk in recent years.**

Military factors play an important role in cross-strait relations. Taiwan changes its military strategies from "offensive Operation" to "resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence". Though it has surrendered "counterattack against the mainland", it has still been making active preparations for possible wars, hoping to refuse reunification by force. "Multi-domain deterrence" means to deter the mainland and prevent its military actions for national reunification by developing military forces.

From 1950 till the late 2000s, Taiwan had dominated over the mainland in naval and airborne forces. Later, the situation turned around but Taiwan has never stopped building or procuring advanced equipment to grow its "asymmetrical capabilities". In recent years, Taiwan continuously improves its standoff attack capabilities, which embodies the "multi-domain deterrence" strategy. In response, the mainland has no choice but to prepare itself for military struggles with Taiwan. By 2019, the mainland has completed the building of critical military frameworks and the military preparation against

---

Taiwan.

Cross-strait trade value has kept growing, which reflects more economic and trade exchanges between the two sides. Yet the over large trade deficits of the mainland can raise the risk.

Social exchanges across the strait has gone through the growth period and entered a falling stage. Public opinions among people of both sides are extremely “unfriendly”, leading the cross-strait risk to rise.

Support for Taiwan from countries represented by the US is the external cause of the deterioration of the situation in Taiwan Strait. In history, the US' stationing its troops into Taiwan obstructed the unification of China. In present days, the US has been continuing arm sales to Taiwan and sending naval vessels to sail through the Taiwan Strait more and more frequently in recent years. **This is the primary external factor stimulating tensions in Taiwan Strait.** Japan and Australia are also showing their support for Taiwan in higher frequency. Emboldened by the support from its “allies”, Tsai Ing-wen's office has gone further down the road of “Taiwan Independence”.

In summary, to improve the stressful cross-strait relations in high risk, **Taiwan authorities should change their attitude to the Taiwan problem and get back on the road to make conscientious efforts for promoting peaceful settlement and friendly consultation in the first place. And the US and other countries have to practically implement the “One China” policy and should not allow Taiwan authorities any illusions.**

Without the above two changes, the cross-strait risk will only continue rising to new highs. Now the risk has exceeded the high level in the 1950s. Yet the mainland's military power is “no longer what it used to be”. The mainland government and its people are in unprecedented high spirits for defending the “One China” principle. What's more, extraterritorial intervention capabilities are gradually decaying. Based on all these, it's only a matter of time for the two sides to burst into fierce armed conflicts. “Don't say I didn't warn you”, which the mainland side cited previously, is a serious warning of the possibly coming qualitative change in cross-strait relations after continuous deterioration. If undesirable results really appear, Taiwan authorities as the greatest stimulating variable will have to take full responsibility.

The building of Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index is still at the primary stage with some visible questions. For example, how to work scientifically when

---

coding the qualitative indicators, and how to reach a standard coding logic when the data of different qualitative indicators vary largely in nature. Meanwhile, since the cross-strait relations are complicated, there might be some omissions in this report, which the research team will try to improve in future practice.

















## Appendix 2 Cross-Strait Trade

year	Cross-strait trade in goods in Millions of USD	Exports from mainland to Taiwan	Imports to mainland	balance	mainland foreign trade in millions of USD	Taiwan foreign trade in millions of USD	cross-strait trade as a percentage of total mainland foreign trade	cross-strait trade as a percentage of total TW foreign trade	Taiwan projects approved in the mainland	Actual use of Taiwan investment in millions of USD	mainland investment in TW in millions of USD
1950					1,130						
1951					1,960						
1952					1,940						
1953					2,370						
1954					2,440						
1955					3,140						
1956					3,210						
1957					3,100						
1958					3,870						
1959					4,380						
1960					3,810						
1961					2,940						
1962					2,660						
1963					2,920						
1964					3,470						
1965					4,250						
1966					4,620						
1967					4,160						
1968					4,050						
1969					4,030						
1970					4,590						
1971					4,840						
1972					6,300						
1973					10,980						
1974					14,570						
1975					14,750						
1976					13,430						
1977					14,800						
1978	46	46	-		20,638		0.22%				
1979	77	56	21	35	29,330		0.26%				
1980	311	76	235	-159	38,136		0.82%				
1981	459	75	384	-309	44,022		1.04%				
1982	278	84	194	-110	41,606		0.67%				
1983	248	90	158	-68	43,616		0.57%				
1984	553	128	425	-297	53,549		1.03%				

1985	1,101	116	985	-869	69,602		1.58%				
1986	955	144	811	-667	73,846		1.29%				
1987	1,516	289	1,227	-938	82,653		1.83%				
1988	2,721	479	2,242	-1,763	102,784		2.65%				
1989	3,484	587	2,897	-2,310	111,678	118,568	3.12%	2.94%	540	155	
1990	4,043	765	3,278	-2,513	115,436	121,929	3.50%	3.32%	1,103	220	
1991	5,793	1,126	4,667	-3,541	135,634	139,038	4.27%	4.17%	1,735	470	
1992	7,410	1,120	6,290	-5,170	165,525	153,471	4.48%	4.83%	6,430	1,050	
1993	14,395	1,462	12,933	-11,471	195,703	162,151	7.36%	8.88%	10,948	3,140	
1994	16,320	2,240	14,080	-11,840	236,621	178,383	6.90%	9.15%	6,247	3,390	
1995	17,880	3,100	14,780	-11,680	280,864	215,204	6.37%	8.31%	4,847	3,160	
1996	18,980	2,800	16,180	-13,380	289,881	218,307	6.55%	8.69%	3,184	3,470	
1997	19,838	3,396	16,442	-13,046	325,162	236,500	6.10%	8.39%	3,014	3,290	
1998	20,500	3,869	16,631	-12,762	323,949	215,241	6.33%	9.52%	2,970	2,920	
1999	23,477	3,950	19,527	-15,577	360,630	232,273	6.51%	10.11%	2,499	2,600	
2000	30,533	5,039	25,494	-20,455	474,297	288,321	6.44%	10.59%	3,108	2,300	
2001	32,340	5,000	27,339	-22,339	509,651	234,279	6.35%	13.80%	4,214	2,980	
2002	44,647	6,586	38,061	-31,476	620,766	248,550	7.19%	17.96%	4,853	3,970	
2003	58,364	9,004	49,360	-40,356	850,988	278,602	6.86%	20.95%	4,495	3,380	
2004	78,304	13,544	64,759	-51,215	1,154,554	351,114	6.78%	22.30%	4,002	3,120	
2005	91,230	16,550	74,680	-58,131	1,421,906	381,035	6.42%	23.94%	3,907	2,150	
2006	107,832	20,733	87,099	-66,366	1,760,438	426,708	6.13%	25.27%	3,752	2,230	
2007	124,487	23,460	101,027	-77,567	2,176,175	465,922	5.72%	26.72%	3,299	1,770	
2008	129,215	25,877	103,338	-77,461	2,563,255	496,069	5.04%	26.05%	2,360	1,900	
2009	106,222	20,501	85,720	-65,219	2,207,535	378,038	4.81%	28.10%	2,555	1,880	37
2010	145,413	29,674	115,739	-86,064	2,974,001	525,829	4.89%	27.65%	3,072	2,480	94
2011	160,018	35,109	124,909	-89,800	3,641,864	589,687	4.39%	27.14%	2,639	2,183	52
2012	168,981	36,777	132,204	-95,426	3,867,119	571,646	4.37%	29.56%	2,229	2,847	332
2013	197,039	40,634	156,405	-115,771	4,158,993	575,330	4.74%	34.25%	2,018	2,088	349
2014	198,284	46,277	152,007	-105,731	4,301,527	587,714	4.61%	33.74%	2,318	2,018	335
2015	188,097	44,892	143,204	-98,312	3,953,033	508,999	4.76%	36.95%	2,962	1,537	244

---

2016	179,088	40,241	138,847	-98,606	3,685,557	508,418	4.86%	35.22%	3,517	1,963	247
2017	199,939	43,979	155,961	-111,982	4,107,138	572,736	4.87%	34.91%	3,464	1,772	266
2018	226,243	48,643	177,600	-128,957	4,622,415	618,846	4.89%	36.56%	4,911	1,391	231
2019	228,122	55,109	173,013	-117,903	4,577,891	614,844	4.98%	37.10%	5,252	1,587	97
2020	260,806	60,142	200,664	-140,523	4,646,257	631,066	5.61%	41.33%	5,105	1,000	58.1 (till July)

## Appendix 3 Social Exchanges and Public Opinions

years	Visits of people from mainland to Taiwan		Visits of people from Taiwan to mainland	Cross-strait marriage	“武统台湾” google trends	Taiwan residents' identity			
	Family visits and sightseeing	Education	Total			Total	Taiwanese	Chinese	Both
1992						17.6	25.5	46.4	
1993									
1994						20.2	26.2	44.6	
1995						25	20.7	47	
1996						24.1	17.6	49.3	
1997						34	19.2	41.4	
1998						36.2	16.3	39.6	
1999						39.6	12.1	42.5	
2000						36.9	12.5	44.1	
2001					26,516	41.6	10.6	43.1	
2002					28,603	41.2	9.2	43.7	
2003					34,685	42.5	8.3	43.3	
2004					10,642	19	41.1	6.2	47.7
2005					14,258	0	45.0	7.2	43.4
2006					13,964	0	44.2	6.3	44.9
2007					14,721	0	43.7	5.4	44.7
2008	151,812	1,216	329,204	188,744	12,274	0	48.4	4	43.1
2009	610,447	3,975	972,123	1,516,087	12,796	0	51.6	4.2	39.8
2010	1,332,124	8,259	1,630,735	2,424,242	12,807	0	52.7	3.8	39.8
2011	1,410,007	9,060	1,784,185	2,846,572	12,800	1	52.2	3.9	40.3
2012	2,077,809	3,366	2,586,428	3,139,055	12,034	1	54.3	3.6	38.5
2013	2,322,783	6,644	2,874,702	3,072,327	10,829	0	57.1	3.8	35.8
2014	3,456,982	11,906	3,987,152	3,267,238	10,044	0	60.6	3.5	32.5
2015	3,506,751	19,064	4,184,102	3,403,920	9,322	0	59.5	3.3	33.3
2016	2,913,131	25,191	3,511,734	3,685,477	8,673	0	58.2	3.4	34.3
2017	2,155,655	28,672	2,732,549	3,928,352	7,634	106	55.5	3.7	37
2018	2,104,129	28,984	2,695,615	4,172,704	6,944	86	54.5	3.7	38.2
2019	2,111,739	28,368	2,714,065	4,043,686	6,698	133	58.5	3.5	34.7
2020	47,291	5,405	111,050	414,634	2,363	446	64.3	2.6	29.9

## Appendix 4 Indicators Coding Result

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
A11 Taiwan authoriti es' policies concernin g the mainland	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	6	6	6	6	6
A12 NCCPC policies and CPC leaders' statement s concernin g Taiwan	10	10	10	10	10	10	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	0	0	0	0	-3	-3	-3	-3	
A13 Taiwan policies in the mainland' s Five- Year																																				
A Plans	/	/	/	9	9	9	9	9	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	
Pol A21 High- iti level cal visits Rel between ati the two ons sides	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	
Political Index	10	10	10	10	10	10	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	5	5	5	3	2	2	2	2



	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
B11 Taiwan's defense emphasis and the mainland factors	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	6	6	6	6	6
B12 The mainland's defense emphasis and Taiwan factors	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
B13 Military expenditures of the two sides each year	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
B22 Military frictions between the two sides	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	0	0	0	0	0	
B31 Destroyers amount comparison	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	4	5	5	4	4	2	3	4	3	2	3	2	3	2	2
B32 Frigates amount comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2
B33 Conventional Submarines amount comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	7	7	7	7	7
B34 Nuclear Attack Submarines amount comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	5	5
B41 Large Landing Ships amount comparison	1	1	1	1	3	3	2	3	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	9	9	9	8	8	8	8
B42 Dock Landing Ships amount comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	4
Military Power B43 Amphibious Assault Ships(Helicopter Carriers) amount comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B44 Marine Corps building and comparison	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
B51 4th Generation Fighters amount comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B52 5th Generation Fighters amount comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B53 Medium and Long Range Bombers amount comparison	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	4	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
B54 Airborne troops force comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
B61 Medium and Long Range Ballistic Missiles force comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B62 Cruise Missiles force comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B71 3rd Generation Main Battle Tanks comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B81 Air Early Warnings comparison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Military Index</b>	<b>2</b>																																			
weight	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	30	30	30	30	30	30	30







	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985				
E11 US arms sales to Taiwan over the years	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	7	7	7	7	7	7	7			
E12 US Navy's activities in Taiwan Strait	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	/	/	/	/	/	/	/				
E21 Japan's policies and positions on Taiwan	/	/	9	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	7	7	9	0	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/				
E22 Australia's policies and positions on Taiwan	/	/	/	/	/	9	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	9	0	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/				
Foreign Affairs Index	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	3	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	7	7	7	7	7	7				
weight	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20				
	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021				
E11 US arms sales to Taiwan over the years	7	7	7	7	7	7	8	9	8	7	7	7	7	7	9	9	7	7	7	7	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	9	9	9
E12 US Navy's activities in Taiwan Strait	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	7	9	9	9		
E21 Japan's policies and positions on Taiwan	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	2	/	2	/	/	4	/	4	4	/	/	/	/	/	6	/	7	/	/	/	/	/	/	4	4	4	8			
E22 Australia's policies and positions on Taiwan	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	3	7	/	4	/				
Foreign Affairs Index	7	7	7	7	7	7	8	9	8	7	5	7	5	7	7	9	7	7	6	6	7	7	8	8	8	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	5	7	7	7	9		
weight	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20			

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Cross-Strait Relations Risk Index	6.73	6.73	6.73	6.60	6.62	6.52	6.09	6.11	6.04	6.04	6.09	5.93	5.93	5.93	5.93	5.93	5.89	5.91	6.41	6.46	6.73	5.36	6.73	6.76	6.78	6.73	6.78	4.55	4.27	4.05	3.25	2.60	2.62	2.63	2.68	
	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
	2.43	1.60	1.58	1.58	1.65	0.95	0.66	0.86	0.60	3.70	3.43	3.54	3.35	3.90	3.97	5.13	4.93	5.04	4.82	4.97	5.10	4.99	4.71	4.79	4.79	4.14	4.11	4.05	4.21	4.06	4.74	5.37	6.14	6.59	6.58	7.21